DOES CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY LEAD TO LOWER LEVELS OF REGIME RESPECT FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS?

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This dissertation is a cross-national investigation of the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and regimes' respect for basic human rights. The quantitative human rights literature has not yet addressed the question of whether high levels of cultural diversity are beneficial or harmful. My research addresses this gap.

I address the debate between those who argue that diversity is negatively related to basic human rights protection and those who argue it is likely to improve respect for these rights. Ultimately, I propose that regimes in diverse countries will be less likely to provide an adequate level of subsistence (otherwise known as basic human needs) and security rights (also known as integrity of the person rights) to their citizens than regimes in more homogeneous countries.

Using a data set of 106 non-OECD countries for the years 1983 and 1993, I employ bivariate, linear multivariate regression, and causal modeling techniques to test whether higher levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are associated with less regime respect for subsistence and security rights. The analysis reveals that higher levels of cultural diversity do appear to lead to lower respect for subsistence rights. However, counter to the hypothesized relationship, high levels of diversity appear to be compatible with high levels of respect for security rights.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the past several decades we have witnessed a great increase in the amount of research devoted to what determines the level of a government's respect for its citizens. Researchers have attempted to empirically identify links between human rights and social phenomena including, but not limited to population size and growth, civil and international war, the level of economic development, constitutional statements regarding human rights, and colonial history. It is the goal of my research to investigate an under-examined social phenomenon and its relationship to government performance with regard to individual rights--the level of ethnic and religious diversity in a particular country. Diversity in its most basic sense can be thought of as the level of social heterogeneity due to ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages. Although at some level there are some differences among the terms for societal heterogeneity that will be discussed herein, for discussion purposes I will refer to "cultural diversity," "fractionalization," and "heterogeneity" interchangeably. In my dissertation I examine the relationship between the level of societal fractionalization in a country and the level of security, subsistence, and political rights that its citizens are afforded.

1.1 The Research Question

With the end of World War II came the beginning of a fundamental shift in our understanding of the role of the state in international relations. Spawned by an awareness

of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, the international community began to reject the long-standing idea that leaders in sovereign nation-states have the right to govern their citizens in any way they please, even if the means for doing so are brutal. Instead, during the postwar period many began to believe that individuals are endowed with certain rights merely because they are humans. This idea, or movement, gained strength with the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was further bolstered by a series of covenants and conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the (as yet unratified by the United States) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.[1]

In the 1970s came a concerted effort by newly formed human rights organizations to monitor and report on the human rights practices in practically every country in the world. Aided by recent developments such as the microcomputer, the Internet, and better reporting practices, organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House have worked to pressure governments into more humane treatment of their citizens by making the human rights records of various countries available to the rest of the world. The idea behind these efforts is that governments that know that they are being watched by individuals, international organizations, and governments will be less likely to violate the rights of their citizens for fear of attracting a negative reaction from the international community.

[1]The first of these documents, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the United Nations on December 16, 1966. It is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. The International Covenant on

In the past two decades or so, social scientists have begun to apply their systematic research methods to take advantage of the improved information that has become available on human rights practices around the world. Researchers have attempted to apply social scientific techniques to the study of human rights in order to gain a more thorough understanding of regime behavior. The goals of this research are twofold: 1) to predict where future human rights crises may occur in the future, and 2) to arrive at a general explanation for why human rights abuses occur. One may hope that achieving these research goals will improve the human condition in some way.

More specifically, this dissertation falls into a category of social scientific research devoted to understanding what causes a regime to respect or to violate the basic human rights of its citizens. Researchers have created and tested theories that link government respect for basic human rights to a number of explanatory factors, including population size and growth, colonial history, regime type, economic growth and development, civil and international conflict, and many others. Some of these factors will be discussed in the next chapter. This dissertation will test yet another one of these purported factors: the level of cultural diversity in a society.

Social scientists have long been interested in the relationship between societal diversity and good governance. Perhaps the best-known debate is between two British scholars of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton (Mill 1958). Mill argued that a common language and culture was a key to securing the free institutions necessary for a well-functioning polity. A common culture is necessary to develop the

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was also adopted on December 16, 1966, and is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.

consensus that is necessary for representative government to function in a manner that will secure basic rights. Acton, to the contrary, argued that it was the existence of culturally different societal groups, each struggling for freedom that would serve as a check against despotism. My dissertation attempts to address the key element of this debate: whether or not a high level of diversity is conducive or harmful to the level of basic human rights that regimes have for their citizens.

While the relationship between diversity and human rights may appear to be an interesting and worthwhile topic of study, until recently there were not enough data available to conduct research on this relationship on a global scale. In the past few years, data have become available that permit measurement of the relative level of diversity in a large number of countries. Although as with all social indicators there are measurement and conceptual problems with the operationalization of an abstract concept, the availability of quantitative data on cultural diversity creates an opportunity for cross-national empirical human rights research because it allows for testing new hypotheses that may lead to more highly developed explanations of regime human rights performance.

I do not enter this research with a strong idea of how I believe cultural diversity will relate to government's respect for human rights. Rather, I believe that since it important to search for a greater understanding of how basic human rights may be respected, it is best not to assume *a priori* that this societal phenomenon is either a blessing or a curse. Reasonably good data for this particular variable are now available, and, as my dissertation reveals, there is an interesting theoretical debate regarding the relationship between diversity and human rights. There may be practical implications

that arise from a greater understanding of this relationship as well. Is it better for the United States to support the creation of multiethnic regimes, as in the case of Bosnia? Or the creation of ethnically homogeneous countries such as East Timor? An investigation into the relationship between diversity and human rights may provide some guidance to the question of whether diversity is better. Thus, for both theoretical and practical reasons, I believe that this effort is a necessary one.

I will discuss in the next chapter the literature that leads into the research question itself, but suffice to say that there has been a great debate in the literature between those who believe that diversity is beneficial and those who perceive it as harmful.

To recap, the research question I will address in this dissertation, briefly stated, is "are regimes in culturally diverse societies more or less likely to respect the basic human rights of their citizens?"

1.2 Organization of the Study

This dissertation is composed of six chapters. This chapter will introduce the research question and discuss the organization of the study. In addition, it will briefly present some arguments for the significance of this study to empirical human rights research and to social science research in general. Chapter 2 is a review of the social science literature that is relevant to my area of research. The chapter will begin with a general overview of the burgeoning literature on human rights research. The second section will outline the important research that sheds light on some aspect of the nexus between cultural diversity and respect for human rights. The third and final section will present three veins of research that may be of use in the study of the nexus between

cultural identity and political conflict: the ethnic conflict literature, pluralist theory, and the social stratification literature.

Chapter 3 will accomplish several purposes. First, it will outline theoretical arguments for why ethnic and religious diversity may be related to the level of subsistence and security rights that governments afford their citizens. Ethnic and religious diversity are hypothesized to lower subsistence rights for two reasons. The first reason is that governments in diverse societies are hypothesized to be less efficient, leading to a lower level of provision of the type of public goods necessary for improving physical quality of life. This undersupply of public goods is due to a loss of efficiency because governments must respond to a large number of conflicting norms and values, and in many cases, languages. The higher costs of "doing business" in a diverse society lead to a lower output of socially desirable goods such as schools, roads, medical care, and infrastructure. Hence, subsistence rights in diverse countries are hypothesized to lag behind those in more homogeneous countries. A second reason is that ruling regimes in diverse societies may feel pressured to meet the specific demands of many large subpopulations within a country. Therefore, rather than devoting public finances toward productive public goods, leaders may be forced to devote resources to goods that benefit only one of the many groups in society.

Ethnic and religious diversity are hypothesized to adversely affect security rights in the developing world for three reasons. The first reason is that competition for scarce resources is more intense while state capacity for dealing with demands for societal groups is weak. One might expect that under these conditions a leader may feel more pressured to deal with societal demands through repression. The second reason is that

societal cooperation is threatened by low levels of societal trust that one might expect to find in a society with a large number ethnic and linguistic cleavages in societies. Finally, leaders in the developing world have inherited from the colonial period a blueprint for governance in which domination by a ruling group over other societal groups is the expected manner of maintaining order.

Second, it will discuss the data that are available for this task, including a description of each variable. Notable in this section is a discussion of the variables that measure ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization.

Finally, Chapter 3 will describe the methods that I will use to address my research question, and discuss the utility of both bivariate and multivariate analyses as a way to explore the relationship between diversity and respect for human rights. Bivariate analysis is a good way to explore in a straightforward fashion the relationship of interest. This type of analysis can be performed using simple statistical techniques and scatter plots.

It is the multivariate analysis, however, that really offers the most potential for evaluating the linkage between diversity and government respect for human rights. This type of analysis is useful because it can assess the effect of the independent variable (ethnic or religious diversity) on the dependent variable (basic human rights). While informative, standard multivariate regression techniques do not allow for the most complete type of analysis possible. In order to clarify the relationship among several potential explanatory variables in a predictive model with human rights as the dependent variable, a path analytical model will be presented. This type of model allows a researcher to estimate not only the direct effects of explanatory variables on the

dependent variable, but for the calculation of indirect effects as well. By understanding both the direct and the indirect effects of ethnic and religious diversity on the level of basic human rights, a researcher may obtain a more complete picture of how cultural diversity fits into the "human rights equation" in combination with other widely used explanatory variables.

The fourth chapter is an analysis of the relationship between diversity and subsistence rights. Bivariate and multivariate analyses are used to explore the nature of the relationship between these phenomena. Hypotheses linking diversity to lower levels of subsistence rights are tested, and the statistical and substantive findings of this analysis are discussed.

The fifth chapter analyzes the relationship between diversity and security rights. As is the case with subsistence rights above, this chapter will test whether ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are conducive or harmful to government respect for security rights, and significant findings of this analysis will be discussed.

The sixth chapter will summarize the important findings and how they fit in with the existing literature on the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights. Furthermore, a list of recommendations for further research will be presented.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This dissertation is significant for two main reasons. First, it addresses a prominent debate in the social scientific literature. On one side of the argument are scholars such as Lord Acton who argue that diverse societies are more likely to be stable, prosperous, orderly, and peaceful. On the other side are those such as John Stuart Mill

who believe that the best polities are those that are relatively homogeneous.[2] While not addressing the issue head on, this dissertation will hopefully provide a preliminary answer to one aspect of this question by ascertaining whether diverse societies are more likely to enjoy high levels of basic human rights than their less diverse neighbors. While there are many types of rights that may be called "basic," this dissertation will focus on the provision of two important categories of rights. By examining the effects of diversity on one aspect of regime performance, this research will hopefully provide guidance for further research on the relative merits of societal heterogeneity as it relates to good governance.

A second major reason why this study is significant is that it adds to the existing and growing set of literature that seeks to understand the causal factors behind the decision of governments to respect or harm the basic human rights of their citizens. A series of studies have assessed the impact on respect for basic rights of such factors as wealth and economic growth, population size and growth, regime type, domestic and international conflict, colonial history, and a number of others (see, for example, Henderson 1994; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Although diversity has appeared as an explanatory variable in a small number of studies (which will be discussed in the next chapter), this is the first one to examine the relationship in a comprehensive fashion, using multivariate and causal analysis to ascertain the relative effect of diversity in conjunction with other political, economic, and demographic factors that are purported to affect the level of respect for human rights. In addition, this study uses two different measures of diversity, one that is based on ethnic and linguistic differences among

[2] For a discussion of the debate between Mill and Acton, see Dahl 1971.

groups, and the other based on religious differences. While a few studies have examined the relationship between diversity and security rights or conflict, and a few have investigated links between diversity and economic development, this is the first study that and examines the effects of diversity on two important but distinct types of basic human rights—security rights and subsistence rights.

The dissertation now turns to a more in depth discussion of the relevant literature.

CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Are high levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity conducive to higher human rights performance? Or are countries with relatively homogeneous populations more likely to enjoy higher levels of democratic development and respect for basic human rights? Recent social scientific research has focused on identifying factors that affect the rights of individuals, but the role of cultural diversity has to date received little attention. This chapter will first survey the current theoretical and empirical landscape of human rights research. It will subsequently discuss the literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and rights. Finally, I will discuss the relevance to my research question of three areas of social science research that relate to group behavior in politics—the ethnic conflict literature, pluralism, and social stratification theory.

2.1 The Rights Literature and Regime Performance

Fueled by the improved availability of information, data collection techniques, and computational power, the empirical study of human rights has already experienced several notable developments in its brief history. Initially, a large percentage of human rights research focused on the relationship between United States military and non-military aid and the human rights records of recipient countries (Schoultz 1980; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Gibney and Stohl 1988;

McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Forsythe 1993; Blanton 1994; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Regan 1995; Poe and Meernik 1995).

Soon, a large body of research arose that focused on explaining cross-national variations in the level of government respect for basic human rights. Shue (1980) argues that there are at least three basic human rights: security, subsistence, and liberty. The first group of rights to receive scrutiny from quantitative research was for the most part security rights, or the right to be free from torture, execution, imprisonment, or violation of personal integrity. Beginning in the 1980's, research on this category of basic rights has begun to progress to a much higher level of statistical and theoretical sophistication.

Basic human rights often have been used as dependent variables in social science research. Wolpin (1986), who examines the relationship between severity of repression and a number of potential explanatory factors, offers an early example of research that treats security rights as a dependent variable. He classifies developing countries by the level of repressive "state violence" used by their governments (102). Taken from a composite of several sources, Wolpin's measure of security rights violations includes such repressive actions as torture, disappearances, executions, and penal system brutality. He finds that military rule, military aid, and ethnic fragmentation are positively associated with rights violations, while literacy and education are associated with low levels of violations. His study is rather broad in that it analyzes the relationship between rights violations and a large number of possible factors (economic, cultural, geopolitical, military status) in 105 non-OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries over multiple years (1973-1980). However, since the state violence variable is divided into only three categories, and because the author fails to

employ a multivariate analysis of the data, the study's ability to isolate the effects of individual factors that lead to human rights abuses is limited.

In a similar research effort, Park (1987) finds that civil rights, as measured by the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index, are positively linked to welfare expenditures, ethnic diversity, and urban population. Factors that are negatively correlated with political rights are education expenditures, military expenditures, and percentage of Muslim citizens in the population.

The work of Mitchell and McCormick (1988) is significant because it isolates the partial effects of several variables on the level of government repression. They find that higher levels of economic development lead to lower levels of torture and erroneous imprisonment by governments. Authoritarian governments, on the other hand, are more likely to resort to murder and execution. While Mitchell and McCormick successfully apply a standards-based approach to a broad cross-section of countries, they only analyze data from a single year (1985). In addition, their methodology does not simultaneously control for the effects of all of the specified alternative explanations for rights violations. With this methodology, it is not possible to identify the most salient factors that contribute to repression because all variables are not included in a single model. In other words, it is not possible to know whether a particular variable has an impact on the level of repression, net of other variables that are also hypothesized to have an impact.

Henderson (1991, 1993) provides a more sophisticated analysis of security rights as a dependent variable in his study of 152 countries. Henderson's methodology for analyzing the relationship is a multivariate regression in which the relative effects of several variables can be included in a single predictive model of repression. He measures

personal integrity rights violations with a five-point Political Terror Scale based on criteria created by Gastil (1980), in which countries are assigned a rank of one to five according to the degree of repression present. Controlling for the effects of population level and growth rate, inequality, and investment, Henderson finds that higher levels of democracy and economic development lead to higher levels of respect for personal integrity rights. In addition, Henderson reports that, holding all other factors constant, faster population growth rates lead to higher levels of personal integrity abuse. Although Henderson's sample size represents an improvement over earlier research efforts, his methodology does not capture dynamic relationships in the data since it only analyzes his data over a single cross-section in time.

Poe and Tate (1994) examine the determinants of personal integrity rights in a study that overcomes the limited cross-sectional problem with a pooled cross-sectional time series (PCTS) design, which can capture relationships across both space (153 countries) and time (1980-1987). They assess the impact of the following variables in a single predictive model of personal integrity violations: economic development and growth; population size and growth; military government; British colonial history; leftist regime; and civil and international war. Poe and Tate find that both civil and international wars lead to lower levels of respect for personal integrity rights by governments. Another variable negatively associated with respect for human rights is population size. They find mixed evidence for a positive relationship between the presence of a leftist regime and security rights violations. The strongest negative predictor of personal integrity abuse is the presence of democracy, as measured by the Freedom House index. Economic development also contributes to higher levels of

respect for personal integrity rights. One notable finding of the study, derived from its dynamic design, is that a country's recent history of personal integrity abuse is an extremely good predictor of future levels of abuse. For the dependent variable, personal integrity abuse, both studies employ a five point Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty International and State Department reports.

Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) expand the number of time points and countries from the earlier study, and achieve similar findings. The significant differences are that in the later study military governments are linked to abuses of integrity rights, while a British colonial history and a leftist government are associated with lower levels of violations.

A recent example of scholarship in the area of security rights is the work of Cingranelli and Richards (1999), who attempt to place respect for various types of security rights on the same scale. They find that as regimes become more repressive, they follow a common pattern. Protections against disappearance and extrajudicial killing usually break down first, when regimes are at relatively low levels of repression. As the regime becomes more repressive, regimes become more likely to violate other types of rights, as torture and political imprisonment become more common. Cingranelli and Richards' work may be a first step by social science in predicting not only the *level* of security rights violations in a country, but the *patterns* in which they may typically violate these rights.

Studies of subsistence rights, or basic human needs, began somewhat later than studies of integrity rights. Moon and Dixon (1985) find that, controlling for the level of economic development, democratic practices and leftist ideology are positively associated with a country's level of basic needs satisfaction during the time period of

1970-75. Higher government expenditures, on the other hand, are negatively associated with respect for integrity rights. The authors measure the provision of basic human needs based on what they term the Disparity Reduction Rate, which is the average annual change in Morris' (1979) Physical Quality of Life Index.

In a subsequent work, Moon (1991) includes regime variables such as military strength, democracy, and per capita GNP in the same model with a series of control variables. He finds that the proportion of rural population, Islamic influence, dependency, and military spending are negatively associated with satisfaction of basic human needs. On the other hand, democracy, socialist influence, wealth, and Buddhist influence are positively correlated with physical quality of life.

Do tradeoffs exist between the various types of human rights? Some, such as Shue (1980) argue that at least three types of "basic" rights (security, subsistence, political) exist—basic in the sense that one cannot be eliminated without infringement upon the other types. Others such as Donnelly (1989) argue that a complex relationship exists between many different types of rights, and that they are indivisible.

While the theoretical relationship among different types of rights has been discussed for many years, only recently have researchers begun to empirically investigate the relationships among them. Milner, Poe, and Leblang (1999) provide a preliminary exploration into the interrelationships among security, subsistence, and political rights. Their research hints that there are not "tradeoffs" between rights. Instead, rights tend to be complementary. The authors use bivariate correlations to discover that each type of right is related to each of the others in developing countries. There is much work to be

done in this area in order to isolate specific instances where tradeoffs may or may not be possible.

2.2 Links Between Societal Fractionalization and Regime Performance?

Does a high level of diversity in a country, on balance, lead to higher or lower levels of government respect for individual rights? Among the proponents of diversity is Amitai Etzioni (1992) argues that people do not desire a homogeneous nation-state, but instead seek efficacy and representation within their existing country. Consequently, the key to a country's development is for governments to accommodate the political, economic, and social needs of individuals. Etzioni warns of the disastrous centrifugal forces that can tear economies and societies apart. He believes that since compromise is a necessary condition for democracy, diverse societies may have an advantage over "socially monolithic" societies, because by their very existence they have recognized the need for compromise.

Rothschild (1981) contends that the presence of multiple ethnic groups facilitates development planning because these groups are logical choices for administrative units:

> Ethnic groups are more serviceable units than socioeconomic classes are for organizing the distribution of the benefits that the state allocates and for managing the tensions that accrue from this distribution…[Thus] ethnic groups learn that organization is a necessary condition for achieving political recognition and extracting socioeconomic awards; governments, in turn, find that this ethnic group consolidation facilitates the performance of their distributive and allocative responsibilities, and hence they reinforce it with their political and administrative decisions and procedures (222).

In addition, diversity is beneficial because ethnic cleavages often facilitate the formation of political parties, which are necessary for the emergence of a viable democracy.

Another proponent of diversity, Lord Acton, argued that ethnic and cultural divisions, and the desire of such groups for liberty, would serve as a check against other groups that might try to gain power:

> The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty…provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interest, multiplying associations and giving the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion (1909, 289).

On the other side of the diversity argument, Michael Lind argues for the "liberal nationalist" perspective, which contends that nationalism, or "the correspondence of nation and state," is a "necessary, if not sufficient condition, for democracy" (1994, 357). While multiethnic states may appear and disappear, and boundaries may change, "one is usually born into a cultural nation for life" (358). The presence of a cultural nation leads to national communities that are more stable and long-lived than "paper" governments. In fact, it is these communities that are capable of forming viable, stable democracies, in part due to enduring stability of the "cultural nation." He points to the failures of multinational states to achieve democracy: Cyprus, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Sudan. Moreover, smaller states tend to be more governable, which bodes well for the presence of democracy and a stable record of respect for human rights.

Kuper (1977) argues that ethnicity often trumps other cleavages and alliances, which leads to high levels of domestic conflict rather than democratic cooperation. He

offers the situation in Burundi in the early 1960's, in which the Tutsi majority committed genocidal atrocities against member of the Hutu ethnic group, as an example of how the primacy of ethnic cleavages can be divisive:

> Democratic representative government rewards the majority, and if the electoral process is ethnically defined, then representative government becomes the rule of the ethnic majority. This was the charge the [Tutsi minority] Burundi government directed against the colonialist and tribalist conception of democracy, with the conception that the ethnic majority had the right to control public affairs, and indeed to survive (98).

In short, Kuper argues that in situations where ethnic divisions are highly salient, chances for a stable nation with enduring respect for the rights of its citizens are very limited.

Warning against the possible dangers presented by diversity, M.G. Smith argues that "cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the structural necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It… necessitates non-democratic regulation of group relationships" (1965, 45).[1] This "non-democratic" regulation would almost certainly result in the violation of human rights.

Robert Dahl argues that ethnic groups and subcultures, rather than economic or social class, are the primary cleavages to be considered in the analysis of political affairs. He joins the debate on the side of those who believe that a multicultural society will be difficult to govern:

> Because conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are so easily seen as threats to one's most fundamental self, opponents are readily transformed into a malign, inhuman "they," whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery that have been the common response of in-group to out-group among all of mankind (1971, 108).

[1] The quote by Smith appears in Lijphart (1977, 18).

Dahl concludes that "polyarchy," his term for regimes that perform well both on the contestation of political issues and on their level of inclusiveness of persons in the political process, is found more frequently in societies with "weak subcultural pluralism" (1998, 147). Only with a certain set of institutional conditions can a state with substantial pluralism attain polyarchy. The underlying difficulty is that:

> Adherents of a particular culture often view their political demands as matters of principle, deep religious or quasi-religious conviction, cultural preservation, or group survival. As a consequence, they consider their demands too crucial to allow for compromise. They are nonnegotiable. Yet under a peaceful democratic process, settling political conflicts generally requires negotiation, conciliation, compromise (150).

Which argument is correct? To date, there has been little empirical research on the effects of cultural heterogeneity on regime performance regarding subsistence, security, and political rights of citizens. My research will first search for empirical links between ethnic fractionalization and rights performance (in order to contribute to cumulative knowledge), and will subsequently add to the literature on rights by developing and testing hypotheses drawn from major theories about these relationships.

This investigation seeks answers to a question that is clearly relevant to the human rights situation in the world today. Ethnic movements for autonomy and independence share headlines with anti-immigration backlash, both in the developed and developing world. If the challenge of diversity makes it more likely that a country's government will resort to repression or other violations of individual rights, then a better understanding of how this relationship might indeed work would be useful to policy makers in the future. Clearly, if democracy is threatened by diversity, then other types of

human rights violations may also be threatened (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 1995; Zanger 2000).

This research question is made all the more relevant by the emergence or re-emergence of a type of ethnonationalism that in many countries threatens the very existence of the nation-state. In a recent work, Benjamin Barber outlines the problem in terms that make it clear that the very concept of a nation-state may be under siege:

> In this tumultuous world, the real players are not nations at all but tribes, many of them at war with one another. Their aim is precisely to redraw boundaries in order to divide—say Kurdish Iraq or Muslim Sudan or Serbian-populated sections of Croatia. Countries like Afghanistan, recently fighting a foreign invader in the name of its national independence, have been effectively dismembered: divided among Pathans, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. This is ethnic membership enhanced via national dismembership—or by expulsion or expunction of unwanted contaminators, as has occurred in slaughter-happy Rwanda. Is this pandaemonium just an extension of benign efforts at multiculturalism? A natural consequence of a centuries-old impulse to self-determination? Or the appearance of a new disease that has corrupted integral nationalism and opened the way to ethnic and religious *Jihad*? (1995, 8-9).

The source of most research on the relationship between diversity and rights performance is the literature on domestic conflict, which falls into two categories: those works that contend that high levels of ethnic fractionalization are beneficial, and those that argue that it is harmful. The first approach associates high levels of ethnic diversity with low levels of domestic conflict. Rummel (1992; 1995), in his study of Nazi Germany, argues that the more crosscutting societal cleavages in a society, the better. He finds that diversity, culture, region, and religion are not linked to the level of state-sponsored mass murder in a given society (1995, 21). In his multivariate study of the determinants of politicides and genocides, Krain (1997) finds that the level of ethnic

fractionalization has no effect on the number of deaths. The important factors, according to Krain, are shifts in the "political opportunity structure," which he operationalizes as external wars, civil wars, extra-constitutional change, and recent history of decolonization within a given state. However, when Krain adjusts for the duration of conflict, he finds that greater levels of ethnic homogeneity are associated with higher numbers of genocide deaths. That is, extreme levels of heterogeneity in a population are associated with less intense conflict.

Other researchers contend that high levels of ethnic diversity are harmful to human rights performance. Gurr (1995), in his influential Minorities at Risk study, bases his research on the premise that ethnic minorities will be more likely to be threatened by regimes, especially those groups that are marginalized by society. He assumes that serious ethnopolitical conflict will occur in countries where minorities are threatened or pose a threat to the current regime. Kuper (1979; 1981) argues that while there are several types of crosscutting cleavages (religious, regional, economic, etc.) that may minimize the level of domestic conflict, ethnic division tends to override these other concerns, playing a key role in fostering domestic conflict. Chalk (1989, 153) contends that the elimination of small, relatively isolated groups on the "frontiers of expanding societies" represents one of the two major types of genocides.

Aside from the conflict literature, little research exists on the relationship between cultural diversity and government respect for individual rights. In the empirical literature, at least two works tie the effects of societal heterogeneity to individual rights. In a global study of countries which are not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Wolpin (1986) performs a bivariate analysis of

political rights, and finds ethnic fragmentation to be negatively associated with human rights. For his dependent variable, Wolpin uses a composite measure of rights based on criteria from Gastil (1981) and Sivard (1991).

Park (1987) examines more than 100 countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, and finds that regimes' respect for the civil rights of their citizens is positively correlated to level of ethnic diversity, level of government spending, percentage of population that is Christian, and percentage of the population that is urban . His dependent variable is taken from the Freedom House Civil Rights Index. His methodology is rather simplistic (bivariate analyses) and is not theoretically sophisticated.

The only researcher who attempts to analyze the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on human rights using a multivariate regression technique is Milner (1998). Using a pooled cross-sectional time series (PCTS) design in a study of 126 countries across 8 years (1981-1988) and 126 countries, ethnolinguistic homogeneity was not found to have an effect on the level of physical integrity rights (as measured by Amnesty International and Freedom House). In the Milner study, economic development was the dominant predictor of government respect for human rights. However, Milner only investigated the relationship between diversity and one type of basic right: security or personal integrity rights. The same pattern may not necessarily hold for other types of rights, such as political or subsistence rights.

The fact that researchers have not yet identified any type of relationship between diversity and basic human rights in a pooled cross-sectional time series design such as that employed by Poe and Tate (1994) should not hinder a search for the relationship between these two phenomena. The number of time points available is extremely limited

or nonexistent for diversity measures making a time series type of design both impractical and imprecise. Therefore, other types of analysis are necessary to examine the relationship between diversity and human rights.

One starting point for a full-scale attempt to properly identify the relationship between diversity and government respect for basic human rights is the study by Walker and Poe (2002). The authors explore this relationship for the developing world using 1990 as their year of analysis. Between 75 and 118 countries are included in the analysis, depending on what data were available for particular measures. Using scatter plots and bivariate analyses in order to identify relationships among the data, they find several linkages between cultural diversity and lower levels of rights provision by regimes.

With regard to economic and subsistence rights, the authors employ a visual inspection of the data and find evidence that ethnolinguistic homogeneity may approximate a sufficient condition for a minimally acceptable level of subsistence, as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). They also find that high PQLI performance did not occur in those countries where extremely high levels of diversity were present. Bivariate analyses show that the relationship between ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and PQLI performance is statistically insignificant, and offer mixed support for the same linkage between diversity and lower per capita domestic product.

In the category of political and civil rights, Walker and Poe find bivariate evidence that high levels of ethnolinguistic homogeneity within a country may be necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for civil rights, as measured by the Freedom House civil rights measure. They do not find a similar relationship between diversity and political rights as measured by Freedom House. While they find no relationship between

ethnolinguistic homogeneity and women's political and legal equality (as measured by Humana), they find that high levels of diversity virtually preclude a high score on the Humana measure for social and economic inequality.

Interestingly, Walker and Poe find no relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and the third type of basic human rights, security rights. This apparent lack of a relationship may be the reason why quantitative scholarly research has so far not analyzed the relationship between rights and diversity, since the bulk of the literature has concerned itself with identifying determinants of security rights rather than other types. While the authors find scattered, rather than overwhelming, evidence for a relationship between higher diversity and lower respect for rights, it is significant to note that in no category of basic rights do they find any evidence for the opposite type of relationship. In other words, there is simply no support in any of the analyses for the hypothesis that higher levels of diversity lead to higher levels of respect for human rights.

2.3 Cultural Characteristics and Political Conflict: Theoretical Links

Why might cultural factors affect the propensity of states to protect the rights of their citizens? While one may argue, based on the above discussion, that the academic literature regarding cultural diversity and human rights is not well developed, social scientists have proposed several links between the presence of cultural cleavages and group conflict. This section will provide a brief discussion of the ethnic conflict literature, followed by a review of the possible contributions of pluralist theory and social stratification theory to my research efforts.

A review of the literature on ethnicity and human rights would be incomplete without a discussion of the ethnic conflict literature, and without a discussion of two

other attempts to explain how group dynamics may lead to political problems in culturally diverse societies: the ethnic conflict literature and pluralist theory.

a. The Ethnic Conflict Literature

Since much of the social science research on ethnicity has focused on ethnic conflict, there may be clues to the relationship between diversity and human rights in this research. With the end of colonialism and the rise of ethnonationalism, it became apparent to some social scientists that ethnic clashes might become one of the salient if not *the* salient factor in politics. Karl Deutsch writes: "not long ago, the proposition was advanced that increased political consciousness could be expected to consolidate the unity of states with homogeneous populations and 'strain or destroy' the cohesion of states with diverse populations" (Deutsch 1961, 501). Deutsch is advancing the argument that an increase in political consciousness is more likely to emerge and to be consolidated in states with homogeneous populations, and to harm the cohesion of states with diverse populations. However, very few states in the modern world are homogeneous, making the possibility of national consolidation through cultural unity a rarity.

Moreover, this emphasis on national unity has led to what Horowitz calls "worldwide institutional and ideological currents" that have led to the growth in ethnic conflict, since as the focus in developing countries shifted away from getting rid of the colonial power, groups began to "compare their standing in society against that of groups in close proximity" (1985, 5). The global reality is that we live in a state system, and therefore as group conflicts emerged in the post-colonial period the ultimate goal of many groups was the establishment of their own separate nation-states. Thus, Horowitz argues, "the ubiquitous character of ethnic conflicts opens opportunities for groups and

movements to become part of a broad and respectable current…its terminology is the language of competition and equality, a remarkably individualist idiom for claims that are advanced on a collective basis" (1985, 5).

What leads groups into conflict with other groups and with the state? Gurr (2000) points out four characteristics of groups and their immediate political environments that may explain when and why groups are likely to mobilize to act upon their political grievances: the salience of communal identity; group incentive for ethnopolitical action; group capacity for ethnopolitical action; and group opportunities for ethnopolitical action (47). Similarly, Drake and Clayton present five factors that they believe lead to ethnic conflict: unequal distribution of material benefits; control of government; dispute over language policy; prestige; and autonomy (1962, 279).

According to Gurr and Harff, there is not a comprehensive or well-accepted theory that explains the "causation or consequences" of ethnic conflict (1994, 78). A handful of approaches have dealt with why ethnic groups may mobilize and enter into conflict with each other or with their government.

Gurr and Harff propose three theoretical approaches to ethnic conflict. An early theory that related to ethnic groups and conflict (although it certainly attempted to explain much more than this particular relationship) was modernization theory. This theory's proponents (Deutsch 1953; Apter 1965) argued that urbanization and increased literacy would obscure tribal and other cultural boundaries between peoples by breaking down "parochial" ethnic group identities and replacing them with loyalty to a broader community such as a candidate, party, nation, or even an entity such as "pan-Africa" (Gurr and Harff 1994, 78). The explosion of ethnic conflict in recent decades, both in the

developed and even in the developing world, has clearly cast a great deal of doubt upon the ability of modernization theory ability to explain relationships among ethnic groups. A competing approach for explaining ethnic conflict, the primordialist perspective, argues that ethnic and religious identities have deep social, historical, and genetic foundations. From this perspective, modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarity, which prompts minorities to mobilize in defense of their culture and way of life (78).

The authors state that an alternative to primordialism is the instrumentalist explanation for ethnic mobilization and conflict. According to the instrumentalist perspective, the main goals of a group are assumed to be material and political gains; cultural identity is invoked only as means to attain these goals.[2] The most important effect of modernization is to increase economic differences, or awareness and resentment of difference, between dominant groups and minorities. "Political entrepreneurs" capitalize on these differences to establish ethnically based political movements aimed at increasing the economic and political well being of their group or region (1994, 78).

Gurr and Harff argue that the primordial and instrumental views are not fundamentally inconsistent:

> We think ethnic groups are most likely to mobilize when both conditions—a strong sense of ethnic group identity in combination with imposed disadvantages—are present. Recent theories of specific kinds of ethnic conflict incorporate both conditions. Scholars have proposed, for example, that secessionist movements like those of Kurds and Miskitos result from three general conditions: the existence of a separate ethnonational community or society; actual or perceived disadvantages in comparison with the central government; and territorial contiguity (79).

[2]See Tilly 1978 for a general discussion of instrumentalism.

While it may seem intuitive that some combination of these factors may lead to ethnic conflict under certain circumstances, this type of analysis begs the question of exactly what those circumstances are. Patchen argues that conditions alone do not necessarily lead to conflict. Rather, conflict most often results when leaders are able to harness group sentiments to maximize their own political influence:

> Sometimes particular individuals within a society try to persuade people that ethnicity is important. They may stress similarities that exist between members of their own ethnic group and differences, real or imagined, between members of their group and other ethnic groups. Leaders or elite members of a particular ethnic group may do this because they have a vested interest in seeing a sharp division and even conflict between ethnic groups. Such divisions may protect and enhance their leadership positions, and may lead to their gaining advantages (such as land or positions) as a result of the interethnic competition (1998, 18).

Leaders may seek to consolidate their power through appealing for group solidarity. In support of the idea that ethnicity may be used to create division and conflict, Brass argues:

> In the movement to create greater internal cohesion and to press more effectively ethnic demands against rival groups, ethnic and nationalist elites increasingly stress the variety of ways in which members of the group are similar to each other and collectively different from others (in Patchen 1998, 19).

But even if we accept that group differences can become salient when they are exploited by elites, we still know little about the circumstances that determine when leaders will choose to emphasize these differences. An important step in the right direction is the work of Snyder (2000). The author argues that leaders are most likely to exploit nationalist tendencies within their countries when democratizing countries begin their experience with mass electoral politics. Specifically, the danger exists in those

regimes in which liberal institutions such as toleration for dissent and respect for alternative political views are not deeply embedded in societal norms. In this situation, leaders are likely to take advantage of the high level of mass participation by resorting to mobilization based along ethnic lines. Thus "ethnic identities might arise during the transition process and then become locked in as the new ethno-democracy institutionalizes its electoral processes, political parties, and rule of law for the majority." Politics in the democratizing society will "coalesce around a distinctive cultural or ethnic core," and toleration for other ethnic or cultural group will vanish (Snyder 352).

The general theme in the conflict literature is that cultural groupings can be important under certain conditions. The arguments tend be somewhat tautological—we can expect ethnic conflict to erupt in those places where ethnic divisions leave the society ripe for conflict. According to Gurr (2000):

> Ethnic identity may lead to political action when it has collective consequences for a group in its relations with other groups and with states…more exactly, to the extent that ethnicity is a major determinant of a people's security, status, material well-being, or access to political power, it is likely to be a highly salient part of their identity…when ethnic identity is highly salient, it is likely to be the basis for mobilization and political action (6).

Another example of this tautological basis for ethnic conflict may be found in the work of Patchen:

> First, the type of similarities that become most salient are those that most affect their interactions. When differences affect transactions between people, distinctions based on such differences become important (1998, 19).

In short, while the ethnic conflict literature does provide clues as to why groups may become antagonistic toward one another or toward the state, it does not specify when these conflicts may actually take place.[3] In other words, to know that when ethnic cleavages are salient that they lead to conflict does not tell us how to determine which cleavages are indeed salient. A researcher who wishes to investigate the relationship between ethnicity and human rights is left with the impression that, essentially, there are certain factors that are important, but that there is no way to identify when they are important or not.

b. Pluralist Theory

Another area of the social scientific literature that may address why ethnic and religious groups may come into conflict is the interest group theory known as pluralism. The pluralism literature is familiar to students of American interest group politics. Popularized by David Truman (1951), pluralism explains government decisions in terms of the interactions between government and interest groups. According to pluralist thought, it is natural for groups and divisions to emerge in politics. In contrast to the Founders, who argued against the "dangers of faction," Truman argued that this type of conflict is a legitimate part of the political process. In a restatement of Truman, Nicholls (1974) points out that since in the United States individuals normally belong to several groups (as opposed to feeling fully represented by a single one), the phenomenon of multiple membership "restrains the activities of organized groups," and membership in potential groups serves as a "balance wheel in the American system of government" (24).

[3] For an important exception, see Snyder 2000.

According to the pluralist conception, individuals and groups compete for power and resources within a political "market place" (Nicholls 1974, 27). The equilibrium that emerges between the myriad of economic, religious, ethnic, and geographical interests is created by means of "mutual group adjustment" (Connolly 1969, 3). Such a system is both stable and conducive to democracy because every group has an input into public policy decisions and because "all major groups share a broad system of beliefs and values which encourages conflict to proceed within established channels and allows initial disagreements to dissolve into compromise solutions" (1969, 3).

However, as a theory of interest representation, pluralism does not sharply distinguish ethnic groups from other types of groups in a pluralist society. Robert Dahl, a leading pluralist scholar, claims that "ethnic and religious loyalties--like region, status occupation, and economic position--do not as such produce sharp political cleavages" (1961, 356). Yet just as "interest group" pluralism itself has been attacked for minimizing the inherent biases toward organized interests (Hale 1969; Connolly 1969; Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960), it has also been criticized for not appreciating the role of ethnic groups. A major problem, according to Horowitz, is that "process" theories of democracy (such as Truman's conceptualization of pluralism) were formulated at a time when ethnic conflict and mobilization was at a minimum, and concern themselves with the question of "who gets what." While power may be nice to have, it is primarily a "means to some future apparent good" (1985, 186).

Donald Horowitz, a scholar of ethnic conflict, argues that we should view power not only as a means to secure "tangible goods and benefits," but also as a valued commodity in and of itself:

> Power is the main goal at both ends of a spectrum. At one end, power is sought purely for its value in confirming a claimed status. To attain the status, power need hardly be exercised; the main thing is to gain it. At the other end, power is sought as a means to goals so diffuse, so remote, so difficult to specify, that attainment of power becomes, again, an end in itself. This latter case depicts many situations in international politics, where power is sought to prevent the emergence of direct but distant and dimly perceived consequences. So critical and dangerous are those feared consequences that it is deemed vital to take steps to avert them far in advance of their likely occurrence. In short, power may be desired, not only for the lesser things it can gain, but also for the greater things it reflects and prevents. Power in these two latter senses--confirming status and averting threat—usually entails an effort to dominate the environment, to suppress differences, as well as to prevent domination and suppression by others (1985, 187).

Horowitz likens "ethnic systems" to the international system, in the sense that groups seek power in order to survive: "the fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end" (188). In the post-colonial period, as empires faded, ethnic groups feared that their subordination to colonial powers would be replaced by subordination to another cultural group. It was this fear of domination of outsiders that may have led to the high degree of ethnic tension in post-colonial ethnic states (Coleman and Rosberg 1964, 690).

A group can use its power to confirm its ethnic status through pursuing greater status in terms of citizenship, electoral representation, or official religious or ethnic representation. Indeed, Horowitz argues, very much in contrast to the view of the pluralists, that the symbolic needs of ethnic groups for higher status often take precedence over group needs and interests (188). Thus, he believes that to conceive of conflict between groups as a matter of entitlement (a joint function of comparative worth and legitimacy) "explains why the followers follow, accounts for the intensity of group

reactions, even to modest stimuli, and clarifies the otherwise mysterious quest for public signs of group status" (226).

Another weakness of pluralism is that its narrow focus on group relationships tends to ignore or minimize other contextual and environmental factors that may influence group behavior:

> Truman has been criticized for failing to see that group structure and activity in a particular state can be understood only in the context of the whole 'political system'. The manner in which groups operate, it is suggested, will depend upon the way in which power is distributed in a country, and upon the way in which decisions are made (Nicholls, 23).

Because pluralism does not distinguish ethnic and cultural groups from other types of societal groups, it does not add conceptually to an attempt to understand the relationship between cultural diversity and respect for human rights.[4] Moreover, pluralism is a theory that focuses on how societies can stay in equilibrium, not on the causes of conflict. According to pluralism, political order more or less naturally arises from the process of groups acting upon the interests of their members. This lack of attention to ethnicity can only lead the reader to two conclusions: either that ethnic groups in a society are not distinguishable from other types of societal interests with regard to political behavior; or, if differences do exist, that they are benign and can still be incorporated into a pluralist framework.

c. Social Stratification Theory

Social stratification theory is another area of social scientific inquiry that may affect how groups relate to one another and to the state. With origins in sociology, social

[4] Truman does distinguish formal from informal groups, but does not deal with cultural groups specifically.

stratification theory is an attempt to study the unequal distribution of power, prestige, rights and obligations in society due to one's position in society (rather than due to individual attributes such as genetics or skills) (Littlejohn, 1972, 4). Essentially, the motivation for this theory is to provide an explanation for how societies with differently ranked social groups such as caste or class can survive. Its structural-functionalist roots provide a clue to the answer: societies need to survive, and therefore develop an internal differentiation in order to integrate the various parts of society into a working whole. If members of society accept this moral order, then conflict and chaos can be minimized. Social stratification, or differential ranking of individuals according to their "various social roles and activities," occurs in virtually all societies (Barber 1957, 3).

At first glance, social stratification may appear to be a purely divisive force, but in fact its proponents present it as a mechanism for keeping societies in working order. Wesolowski argues that since the uneven distribution of material rewards and prestige is functionally necessary, social stratification is a "necessary and permanent feature of society." Furthermore, since society needs a "mechanism" to match social positions with particular skills and training, social stratification provides the rewards and prestige to induce individuals to take particular societal positions (Wesolowski 1966, 167). According to Lipset and Bendix, individuals desire to change their status within the social structure because, as self-interested individuals, they can obtain favorable self-evaluation of themselves if they can improve their class positions (1960, 61; see also Davis and Moore 1945). Societal mobility arises within a system of social stratification when individuals "resist and reject and inferior status" (Lipset and Bendix 1960, 63).

How might social stratification theory explain group mobilization and conflict? Lipset and Bendix argue that while many political scientists believe that high rates of social mobility are related to high rates of political stability (and vice versa), the presence of high mobility in "a society in which family background and inherited status are strongly emphasized" may have a *destabilizing* effect (1960, 260). The authors add that in industrializing societies, social mobility only contributes to stability when people believe that the system of rewards is fair, because "a lack of belief in the possibility of achievement may cause considerable resentment in the lower class" (279).

Perceived unfairness among groups is a threat to political stability because people who believe that the social ranking system in their society is unfair will lose faith in the society's moral authority to allocate resources:

> Men have a sense of justice fulfilled and of virtue rewarded when they feel that they are fairly ranked as superior and inferior by the value standards of their own moral community. This sense of justice is an important element in the integration of society. Without it, men tend to cause conflict or become apathetic, and in either case the society is in some measure less well integrated (Barber, 7).

How might social stratification theory improve our understanding of how ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages may be related to social unrest? According to Rossides, economic and political power may center around particular ethnic, religious, or racial groups within diverse societies. While in wealthy industrialized nations class and prestige may or may not coincide with ethnicity and race,[5] the link between cultural attributes such as ethnicity and religion to class, power, and prestige is much

[5] For a description of how social stratification and cultural group membership can have cross-cutting effects, see Barber (1957, 58)

stronger in "preindustrial" societies (1976, 33). Lieberson argues that ethnic stratification, as opposed to economic or class stratification, is unique because it is usually the basis for the "disintegration" of a nation state:

> Ethnic groups are the only strata that have the inherent potential to carve their own autonomous and permanent societies from the existing nation without, in effect recreating its earlier form of stratification all over again. Political separatism offers a solution to disadvantaged groups in an ethnic stratification system that is not possible for groups disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, or economic stratification (1970, 173).

Ethnicity, then, is especially important to students of group conflict because it provides the fault lines across which fights for national self-determination are drawn. Ethnic groups are special because they are the most likely to be autonomy seeking, and by extension may be the most likely to come into conflict with other groups or with the state. Lieberson argues that this "theoretical potential for fission that marks ethnic strata" is borne out by empirical observation, as most separatist movements are grounded in ethnic group movements. He gives the examples of Biafra, Canada, and Europe after World War I (1970, 174). According to Lieberson:

> The most fundamental difference between ethnic and other forms of stratification lies in the fact that the former is nearly always the basis for the internal disintegration of the existing boundaries of a nation-state…ethnic groups are the only strata that have the inherent potential to carve their autonomous and permanent society from the existing nation without, in effect, recreating its earlier form of stratification all over again. Political separatism offers a solution to disadvantaged groups in an ethnic stratification system that is not possible for groups disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, or economic strata (1970, 183).

Nonetheless, Lieberson concludes that it is difficult to assess the effects of ethnicity on stability because of the complex relationship between ethnic and economic stratification. The strength of the work is that it shows that ethnic stratification is not only distinct from economic, gender, or age-based stratification, but that this difference may mean that ethnicity may be a greater source of conflictual behavior than other types of differences. The weakness is that while it clarifies that ethnicity is more likely to lead to conflict than other types of social classifications (economic, gender, age, etc), it does not provide any clues as to *when* these differences will matter. As is the case with the ethnic conflict literature, social stratification theory is helpful in showing that ethnicity *may* be important, but does not specify the condition under which it will matter. While it may intuitively seem clear that when people feel they are receiving unequal rewards or prestige for their efforts, they may not be happy with their society. However, violent or conflictual behavior is only one possible outcome of this feeling. We cannot say that stratification along cultural lines *will* cause problems in highly mobile stratification systems, only that it might do so.

An interesting scholarly attempt to outline the potential effects of social stratification based on ethnicity in society is offered by Himmelstrand (1969). Using a hypothetical Ibo and a hypothetical Yoruba citizen in Nigeria, the author attempts to create a simplified model of how individuals may respond to the differential rewards afforded them by society under a system of ethnic stratification. In this highly simplified scenario, a high-achieving citizen of a lower-ranked tribe is not afforded the same social standing as an equally wealthy member of a more highly ranked tribe. This unequal

status between ascribed status and level of achievement conferred to equally achieving members of different groups is referred to as 'rank inequivalence' (85).

If a member of the lower-ranked group accepts his inferior status, or is unable in any way to affect it, then that person does not behave in any way to change it. Yet if this same person does not accept this relative ranking system, he may engage in what Himmelstrand terms "rank equilibration." Individuals may attempt to improve their social ranking in several ways: they may segregate themselves so that they may cease to interact with the other group, thus avoiding comparisons; they may conceal their ethnic status; they may assimilate into the higher-ranking cultural group; or they may engage in activities that are intended to change the social evaluation of their own ethnic group (i.e., by promoting egalitarianism or by trying to improve their group's level of access to higher positions). A final way in which individuals may respond to inequivalence in ranking is to engage in aggressive behavior (86).

Just as individuals in the group with a lower ascribed status may engage in rank-equilibrating behavior, individuals in the higher ascribed group may respond to this behavior with rank reasserting behavior. Himmelstrand claims that rank reassertion among Yoruba in Northern Nigeria led to chauvinistic, nativistic, and xenophobic behavior, which in turn drove Ibos to attempt a secessionist movement in the South. This simplistic model does not capture many of the inevitable complexities involved in ethnic conflict and mobilization, but it provides a rich theoretical description of how the process may take place. It is certainly possible that rank equilibration and rank reassertion are behaviors that can ultimately explain why violence may be more likely in pluralistic societies.

2.4 Summary and Conclusions

It is apparent from the above discussions of ethnicity and conflictual behavior that cultural attributes of a population may, under conditions of ethnic saliency, contribute to political instability, conflict, and by extension, human rights violations. What the studies lack is any kind of description of *when* ethnicity will matter. The goal of my research is find out if one particular aspect of ethnicity—the level of diversity within given society—can affect the level of respect for basic human rights enjoyed by that country's citizens. While it has so far failed to adequately address this particular question, the academic literature has provided us with enough insight to demand further empirical research into the effects of ethnicity on the surrounding social environment, providing interesting reasons to investigate the relationship between diversity and government provision of basic human rights.

Clearly, the effect of cultural heterogeneity on the level of government respect for individual remains open to inquiry. There is certainly no shortage in the literature of discussion that may tie diversity to human rights in one way or another. There are several theorists who link cultural diversity to both beneficial (e.g., Etzioni, Acton) and harmful (e.g. Dahl, Lind) societal outcomes. The conflict literature contains a number of additional theoretical discussions that attempt to tie the phenomenon of ethnic diversity to conflict. Likewise, there are several empirical studies that examine the relationship between diversity and conflict. In addition, pluralism and social stratification theory are two perspectives that may someday be applied to ethnic groups in a manner that helps to explain why high levels of diversity are beneficial or harmful. Yet in the social science

literature there remains a lacuna of empirical research that explores the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights. This dissertation addresses this gap.

I believe that this investigation into the relationship between diversity and human rights is warranted. First, the preliminary research of Walker and Poe (2002) suggests the existence of several untapped relationships between various conceptions of diversity and the different subtypes of basic human rights. Second, the sheer variety of quantitative literature linking diversity to rights violations, instability, violence, and poor government performance suggests that the extant evidence of negative effects of cultural heterogeneity on human rights performance has implications for human rights research. Finally, a number of studies suggest that ethnic and other cultural divisions may play a special role in conflictual political behavior. One might expect to observe some relationship, then, between rights violations and the nature of cultural divisions.

The next chapter will provide some theoretical arguments for the circumstances under which the level of cultural diversity may matter, and will provide testable hypotheses that will allow me to test these arguments.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA

The theoretical underdevelopment of the relatively new field of human rights research has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that a researcher enjoys great leeway in formulating new theoretical propositions. On the negative side, the limited amount of literature that addresses this topic provides little theoretical guidance. Thus, researchers must draw upon their own resources in order to develop theory with testable propositions. Clearly, the relationship between cultural diversity and regime respect for human rights is an under explored one. Consequently, rather than building extensively upon existing theory, it is necessary to build a theoretical explanation for this relationship using diverse strains in the literature that only indirectly relate to this research question.

This chapter has three primary functions. First, it will present plausible theoretical arguments about the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights in order to generate testable hypotheses. Second, it will discuss the available data that can be used to operationalize the concepts contained in these hypotheses. Finally, it will outline the procedure that will be used to empirically evaluate these hypotheses.

3.1 Toward a Theory of Diversity and Subsistence Rights

Recently, quantitative researchers have begun to examine a broader range of basic rights, including not only security and political rights, but economic and subsistence

rights as well (Dixon 1984; Spalding 1986; Moon and Dixon 1985; Rosh 1986; Moon 1991; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999).

At present, there are no published empirical studies that directly address the relationship between the level of ethnic or religious diversity in a society and the enjoyment of subsistence rights by citizens in that society. Therefore, I will present several plausible arguments regarding the nature of this relationship. Although the previous chapter contains references to a long-standing debate between those who believe cultural diversity is beneficial and those who believe it is harmful, I believe that the former argument is more convincing than the latter. Therefore, I will present a plausible argument for the beneficial effects of homogeneity. There are two somewhat related reasons –one economic and one political— that have a basis in the theoretical and empirical literature.

a. Efficiency

The first argument is from the economic literature. Many related arguments can be found that tie societal homogeneity to economic efficiency. The argument may thus be made that regimes in homogeneous societies can respond to the basic economic needs of their citizens because it is easier for them to respond to the needs of their citizens than is the case in a more diverse society.

Therefore, the first reason that high levels of ethnic or religious diversity may lead to poor subsistence rights in a given country is because of *a loss of efficiency due to the needs of responding to diverse groups and interests*. Societal institutions are not able to perform as well because they must deal with a varied and confusing set of norms, values,

and beliefs. In turn, the government has fewer resources available for meeting the needs of its citizens, including basic human needs such as education, nutrition, and sanitation.

A starting point for the relationship between diversity in society and individual rights can be found in the literature on language and economic development. Specifically, the sociolinguistic literature is used as a starting point for a theory of economic development. Coulmas (1992) argues that there are strong reasons to believe that linguistic homogeneity is a necessary condition for economic development, and that it is actually modernization, rather than the presence of a common language, that is the causal factor for development. One of the necessary social and cultural alterations that a country must make in order to develop is that it must develop a common language. Only a common language that is "fully adapted and understood throughout the nation" is capable of "absorbing and giving expression to Western knowledge" (1992:50).

LaPonce (1987) argues that using more than one language carries a high computational cost, since the brain's neuropsychological limitations limit our ability to register, code, and decode words from one language to another. The complexity of any interaction that involves translation increases the complexity of transaction dramatically, which means that it is much more "costly" to communicate with another individual in a non-native language.

The economic reasoning for the desirability of a common language will be familiar to students of economic historian Douglass North (1990). Essentially, by adapting a common language, countries can minimize societal transaction costs by developing institutions that reduce the level of "uncertainty." At the heart of North's argument is the idea that cultural norms are stored and transmitted via

language, which can structure institutions in ways that limit transaction costs and allow countries to develop a cultural filter that provides "continuity, so that the informal solution to exchange problems in the past carries over into the present and makes those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run societal change" (37).

The economic literature also links cultural and religious homogeneity to economic development and thus indirectly, one might reason, to better provision of basic human needs. Fukuyama theorizes that social capital, which he defines as "an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between individuals" is often a byproduct of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and "other types of cultural norms" (2000, 3). He believes social capital is largely primordial in nature; i.e., it cannot be easily stimulated or created by governments or social interactions.

How might language and culture contribute to the ability of countries to respect and promote the individual economic and political rights of their citizens? As has already been noted, there is a link between economic development and the tendency for countries to honor security, subsistence, and political rights. Beyond this empirical observation, however, one may argue that political institutions are not so different from economic ones. Therefore, if countries can minimize uncertainty and promote the efficiency and flexibility of their formal and informal institutions, they can enjoy good long-term economic and political performance. Political as well as economic norms are embedded in the institutional structure of societies, so it is likely that countries with flexible and

efficient institutions over a long period of time will also have deeply embedded norms that favor economic efficiency and responsiveness to the basic needs of citizens.

In the empirical economic literature, several works have appeared in recent years that support the idea that economic efficiency is associated with higher levels of ethnic homogeneity. In a cross-national study performed for the World Bank, Kuijs (2000) finds that higher economic efficiency is positively correlated with higher levels of ethnic homogeneity. Moreover, the more diverse a country's population, the less likely it is to make public goods expenditures on health and education. In a sense, then, ethnic diversity may represent a double disadvantage for a society by providing lower technical efficiency and less productive social spending. Arcand et al. find that, at least for societies with high illiteracy rates and comparatively dense populations, ethnic diversity is correlated with low rates of economic growth, largely because it "encourages the adoption of policies associated with rent-seeking activities" (2000, 6). It is possible, then, that governments in countries with high levels of cultural diversity may be less likely to respond to the subsistence needs of their citizens because regimes feel pressured to allocate scarce resources to placate the needs of competing societal groups rather than in meeting basic human needs.

b. Appeasement of Groups

A second reason why diverse countries may have lower levels of subsistence rights is more directly tied to a political explanation. Because political officials in societies with high levels of heterogeneity may feel the need to allocate a higher proportion of their resources to goods that benefit only specific subgroups in order to

maintain order and stability in their societies, they are likely to allocate fewer resources to public goods such as those that may help to satisfy basic human needs requirements.

It is quite possible that diverse societies are more likely to be politically unstable. In a cross-national large-N study of a global sample of developed and developing countries, Annett (2000) finds that countries that are diverse across ethnolinguistic and religious lines tend to be more unstable than countries that are not. Using a composite index of nine measures of instability, a two-stage least squares analysis reveals that across three time periods (1960-1980), government size (as measured by government consumption) is positively associated with high levels of social diversity. In other words, governments spend more money attempting to placate groups in society, minimizing the risk of being overthrown.

This sub-optimal use of government resources may lead governments to under-invest in the poor and to skew economic benefits toward a few key members or groups in society rather than to a rather broad cross-section of society. A lack of economic development and rights for citizens may be a result of an ethnically diverse population.

Aside from the indirect link between heterogeneity and provision of economic goods, what else might account for lower levels of government concern for subsistence rights in diverse polities? The economics literature has produced a large body of research linking poor governance to governments that face socially heterogeneous populations.

In a study of African nations, Easterly and Levine (1997) find a strong negative correlation between diversity (as measured by linguistic fragmentation) and government provision of public goods, operationalized by numbers of telephones, percentage of roads paved, efficiency of the electrical network, and years of schooling. Likewise, in a study

of United States cities, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1998) find that, even after controlling for a number of socioeconomic and demographic factors, productive public goods are provided in inverse relation to the level of ethnic fractionalization in a given city.

There may be many reasons for this empirical link, but one of the key theoretical arguments is derived from the public finance literature. Tiebout (1956) argues that heterogeneous societies are unlikely to provide for the welfare of all of their citizens unless people are allowed to sort themselves into communities that provide the public goods that they want. In a United States-based study, Luttmer reports "individuals increase their support for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in their area belongs to their racial group" (1997, 1). To summarize the rationale for why ethnic particularism might lead to underproduction of important public goods, Alesina et al. (1997) offer the following two points: 1) Groups have different preferences; and 2) Utility to one group of using a particular resource is reduced if another group can use it. In other words,

> If a white person perceives that a public good [the authors give the example of a new expressway] is enjoyed mostly by black citizens, he would oppose it precisely for that reason. In other words, the identity of the beneficiaries of the public good directly influences the utility level of each individual. This mechanism would reinforce the argument…that more ethnic fragmentation leads to fewer resources pooled together to provide non-excludable goods (12).

Thus, governments in diverse societies may be inclined to spend less than their more homogeneous counterparts on public goods necessary to basic human needs such as education, nutrition, and health services due to political necessities of dealing with diverse populations.

Hence,

> Hypothesis 1. The more (the less) culturally *homogeneous* a society, the greater (the lesser) the realization of subsistence rights in that country.

3.2 Toward a Theory of Diversity and Security Rights

In recent years, security rights have increasingly fallen under the analytical scrutiny of quantitative researchers (Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1997, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Researchers have focused on understanding the determinants and extent of coercive activities by governments, including but not limited to torture, forced disappearance, murder, and imprisonment of persons for their political views. Such government acts are designed to induce compliance in others. Compliance may occur not only as a result of direct violations of individual security rights, but also because governments use these acts as a form of "state terrorism" to induce others to comply after the fact (Poe and Tate 1994, 854; also see Gurr 1986).

While to a degree the academic literature (see above) addresses the relationship between diversity and economic performance (and by extension provision of economic rights), and to a lesser degree political rights, there is little scholarship on the relationship between diversity and personal integrity or security rights.

In keeping with the preponderance of the literature, which holds that diversity presents problems for governance, one might attempt to come up with a theoretical basis for why a regime in a diverse society might be *more likely* to repress its citizens, all other

things being equal. In order to come up with a theoretical proposition regarding repression in a plural society, one must first accept a basic assumption regarding what might make a government resort to repression in the first place. I assume that regimes are rational in that they seek to maximize their expected utility, and they will act accordingly. Primary among these goals is, understandably, to stay in power. According to Booth and Richard (1996):

> Regimes and their supporters employ political repression for simple reasons—to manage, reduce, or suppress the activities of their opponents, or to shape or limit the level and nature of citizens' demands upon the regime and state. Thus by and large repression is instrumental in that it seeks to defend the power, perquisites, and resources of rulers and their allies from pressures from other elites and from mass publics (1206).

If we assume that leaders will use repression to maximize their goals, then why might regimes in more diverse countries in the developing world be more likely to repress their citizens? I look to three possible reasons why these leaders may make this decision.

a. Intense Competition for Resources, Weak State Capacity for Dealing with Group Demands

While there is no limit to the amount of demands that can be placed upon the state, there is limit to the resources that leaders have to deal with these competing demands. While this situation exists in all countries, these demands appear to present a much greater challenge to ruling regimes in the developing world. Nevitte (1986) offers two reasons why this may be the case. First, the level of resources available for distribution in developing societies is much lower than is true in the developed world. Thus, competition for these scarce resources can be seen as being more intense:

> Any allocative decision is difficult in an environment of weak institutional structures and organizations. But those decisions are even more difficult in that environment where there is crippling economic scarcity and an absence of significant other crosscutting societal divisions that could countervail or moderate ethnic communal identifications (3).

While regimes in developed industrialized countries may often have the option of offering payoffs in the form of budgetary transfers to aggrieved groups in exchange for some degree of acquiescence, this option is not often possible to the leadership in poorer countries because the institutions necessary for such fiscal transfers are not in place. Second, in the developed world leaders are often able to limit the demands on the state for resources from societal groups with assurances that cooperation in the short term will lead to economic growth and prosperity in the long run. Because developed countries have a great deal of economic capacity, they are able to at least offer the credible possibility (although certainly not a guarantee) that economic growth and further development are possible in a reasonable time frame if aggrieved groups will mute their challenges to the state in the name of societal cooperation. Contrast this situation with the one faced by leaders in a developing society, where promises for long-term progress in return for short-term cooperation can almost inevitably be met with great skepticism. Leaders in countries that have always been poor and underdeveloped cannot easily pacify unhappy societal groups with the promise that economic prosperity is only a few years away. Moreover, the possibility of democratic competition as a means of determining which resources go where appears to be almost prohibitively difficult in highly plural societies, according to both Dahl (1998) and Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). In short, the

prospects for a consensual or bargained method for determining the allocation of scarce resources appears to definitely be more difficult in a culturally diverse nation.

Thus, the inability of leaderships in the developing world to appease disaffected groups with promises of side payments or future economic growth leaves them with fewer options in dealing with these unhappy segments of society. One obvious option is political repression. Now, of course it is true that leaders in all poor countries face these same problems. However, the requirements of dealing with a large number of distinct cultural groups can not make the task of maintaining order any easier. Moreover, there are two more considerations that may lead societal group demands to be seen as more threatening when they occur in ethnically or religiously diverse societies.

b. Threat to Cooperation from Low Societal Trust and the Unique Nature of Ethnic and Cultural Groups

A second consideration is that the nature of civil society in culturally diverse countries in the developing world is different than it is in more homogeneous societies. Francis Fukuyama is one of the important modern-day civil society theorists. Clearly, social capital, which Fukuyama (2000) defines as "the instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals," is a key to the development of "the type of associational life [i.e., civil society] that is necessary for the success of limited government and modern democracy" (3). Social capital is necessary to the development of "formal coordination mechanisms" such as contracts, bureaucratic rules, and hierarchies. While these mechanisms can exist without social capital, they cannot ensure that cooperation will take place. The reason, according to Fukuyama, is that there

will be additional “transaction costs of monitoring, negotiating, litigating, and enforcing formal agreements" (6).

However, Fukuyama does not believe that social capital has an automatically beneficial effect on society. While theorists such as Coleman (1988) have described social capital as a public good that can be used to develop bonds of trust and cooperation among society, Fukuyama is more skeptical, because he believes that the norms developed in these human relationships are only fully actualized in dealings with one’s friends. In a diverse society, one would not expect it to be more difficult for things such as “trust networks, civil society, and the like” to develop across ethnic and religious divides. As Fukuyama (2000) describes the problem:

> Social capital seems less obviously a social good than physical or human capital…[because]…it tends to produce more in the way of negative externalities than either of the other two forms. This is because group solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility toward out-group members. There appears to be a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and enemies that is the basis of all politics (4).

The role of social capital in diverse developing societies, then, is an important key to understanding the potential problems these societies may experience. The problem is that groups have a low level of trust *vis a vis* other groups. The situation is made worse in countries where economic modernization has not yet broken down traditional forms of culture—“social groups like clans, village associations, religious sects, and the like”—because these groups have a “very narrow radius of trust” (5).

In other words, social capital does not spread through the whole society as it does in developed industrialized nations; rather, it circulates among individual social groups to

a much higher degree. As a result, the bad effects (what Fukuyama terms "negative externalities") of social capital may lead group members to perceive outsiders with "suspicion, hostility, or outright hatred" (4). If these types of problems exist in a comparatively homogeneous society, surely the possibility exists that they might be even worse in a society with a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, all with their own demands and trust networks. It is certainly possible that one "negative externality" of maintaining group solidarity within the ruling group is state-sponsored repression of other societal groups.

While regimes in every country in the world face demands and political pressure from a number of societal groups, ethnic differences among groups may be the most troublesome ones to deal with. This is because, at least in the developing world, ethnic cleavages may be much more enduring than other types of cleavage. Nevitte (1986) argues that ethnic group memberships are different than other types of group memberships. First, it is very difficult or impossible for members to shed their identification. Second, ethnic rivalries are one of the basic axes of political conflict, often because ethnic factors were a crucial decision in the founding of the state. The logic behind this increased salience becomes clearer when one considers the fact that it is more likely to directly threaten regime stability than other types of political rivalries, "even to the point of threatening the stability of the regime itself" (5).

The fact that ethnic identities run deeper than other types may indeed have implications for the group in power. Nevitte's argument that regime stability is threatened by ethnic cleavages is shared by Roeder (2000) who argues that:

> The escalation of ethnopolitical conflict to ethnonational crises represents one of the most threatening domestic challenges to the state since it ultimately seeks not only to change the government or the regime, but also to change the very boundaries of the state itself (3).

So the conflict may not just be for immediate control of the state, but for the entire history of the nation and the society. Roeder supports this claim by noting that of the six regimes that have "failed" since 1960, all of them have occurred in the 51 most ethnically heterogeneous countries in the world (2000, 3). Clearly, the ethnic politics game can be played for very high-stakes.

Ronen (1986) agrees with Nevitte about the potential destructiveness of the ethnic factor in the politics of developing countries:

> Ethnicity is politicized into the ethnic factor when an ethnic group is in conflict with the political elite over such issues as the use of limited resources or the allocation of benefits—issues that are particularly intense in developing Third World countries, where the greater the stakes involved, the greater the ethnic factor with which the central government must deal (1).

Although it is not clear beyond a doubt that ethnic problems are worse in highly diverse societies than they are in homogeneous societies, this appears to be the consensus among many political economists (Collier 1998; Roeder 2000). World Bank Development expert Paul Collier argues: "In general, particularly among policymakers, there is still a common presumption that 'ethnic hatreds' created by communal cleavages are the chief cause of ethnic conflict" (1998, 3).

I know of no theoretical literature that directly addresses the relationship between diversity and security rights. However, the arguments presented in this section regarding the extreme salience of ethnicity in societal power interactions; and the existence of the

potential for a large number of “negative externalities” from the social capital developed by a large number of groups, leads me to believe that leaders in diverse societies may be more willing to repress opposition groups rather than dealing with their demands in some more accommodative manner.

c. The Historical Pattern of Cultural Domination

Finally, we must consider the political patterns with which leaders in diverse developing nations are most familiar. Roeder (2000) notes that both J.S. Furnivall and John Stuart Mill believed the predominant method for dealing with a multiplicity of societal cultural groups in the developing world is through “domination” (7). Domination may result in ethnic control, which Roeder describes as what occurs when “a superordinate ethnic segment uses the state as an instrument to control a subordinate ethnic segment, and allocate resources in the interests of the group’s elite" (8).[1] Mill argues that in plural societies, the maintenance of stability requires “a constitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant, authority in the chief rules” (Mill 1962 [1861], 84).[2] During the colonial period it was the responsibility of the colonial power to ensure social order. Generally speaking, the type of rule that the colonial rulers preferred was a heavy-handed and top-down style governance. When countries gained independence at the beginning of the post-colonial period, the job of ensuring domestic stability obviously fell to whichever group or groups rose to power. In many if not most cases, the method of governance they were most familiar with was the dominant style of the former colonial powers.

[1] Roeder is summarizing the description of domination presented by Lustick (1979).
[2] The source for this quote by Mill is Roeder (2000), p. 7.

Thus, it appears that the historical blueprint for how to govern ethnically diverse societies is largely through domination. Without question, imprisonment, torture, and the like were common tools that the colonial powers used to maintain their hold on power. Clearly, repression of the right to integrity of all groups in society (not just patently ethnic ones) can be considered a logical policy response to unrest in countries where the historical pattern of maintaining power in a multiethnic society has been through domination. According to M.G. Smith (1969):

> The monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form…the dominant section must simultaneously monopolize positions of power and immobilize the subject categories by suppressing or proscribing their collective political organization (155).[3]

These three factors are obviously not the only ones that leaders must consider when deciding how to maintain power. In fact, there are countless demands on leaders in any society, and these factors may not play a predominant role. However, when taken together, these three concerns may have enough of an impact to make a difference in how a regime treats its citizens, *ceteris paribus*. In other words, all other things being equal, we might expect that the ruling group in a highly diverse society might be more likely to respond with repression in a given situation than would the ruling regime in a rather homogeneous society. In other words, it will be the purpose of my research to investigate whether there is a general trend in the direction of higher government repression in more culturally diverse countries.

[3] The source for this quote by Smith is Roeder (2000), p. 8.

Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001) find that regimes that face more threatening levels of activity by opposition groups are more likely to commit security rights violations such as torturing and imprisoning political prisoners. It may be consistent with this finding that leaders of more highly diverse countries are more likely to commit security rights violations because they perceive a greater level of political threat to their hold on power than do leaders in more homogeneous countries.

Hence,

> Hypothesis 2. The more (the less) culturally *homogeneous* a society, the greater (the lesser) the realization of security rights in that country.

3.3 Operationalization and Data Sources

In order to empirically test the relationship between societal heterogeneity and regime respect for individual rights, one must assume that the relevant concepts are operationalizable. However, one must also be able to quantify the key independent variable, diversity. I will now discuss how the concepts of diversity and human rights are operationalized, as well as the nature of and sources for the data that I will use.

a. Independent Variables

For the purposes of this research project, the causal arrow is hypothesized to run from societal heterogeneity in the direction of a number of widely used indicators of regime performance.

In the empirical social science literature, the most popular measure for calculating diversity has been the ELF60, (an abbreviation for the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index for the Year 1960) index created by Taylor and Hudson (1960) and later used by

Krain (1990) and Annett (2000). This measure is borrowed from the literature on party competitiveness, and uses a scalar number from .01 to .99 to measure the level of diversity, with .01 representing the lowest level of diversity and .99 being the highest. According to this type of diversity ranking, a highly homogeneous country (for example, in the ELF60 index Japan's score is .01) receives a score close to zero, while an ethnically diverse country (such as Nigeria at .86) receives a score close to one.

The ELF60 measure calculates the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the same group. It can be calculated using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, which can be written as:

$$\text{Fractionalization} = 1-\sum_{i=1}^{M}(n_i/n)^2 \text{ , } i=1,\ldots, M.$$

where N is the total population, M is the number of groups in the country, and n_i is the number of people belonging to the i-th group. In this measurement scheme, the fractionalization score for a country will increase as does the number of groups and as the size of these groups becomes more equal.

Two potential problems exist with the using a measure such as ELF60. First, by arbitrarily combining two concepts, one may lose information on the true nature of variation among human populations. Second, by relying on a single formula to represent human variation, one may draw conclusions that are strongly influenced by this choice of measurement. While the concept of societal heterogeneity cannot be perfectly captured in a scalar number for a particular country, statistical cross-national studies are well suited to this type of measure because one number can be assigned to each country in the study.

In the future, more sophisticated measures may be created to more fully capture the concept of human heterogeneity, “richness," “evenness,” and other related concepts.[4]

Moreover, the ELF60 measure and its offshoots represents the standard measure of diversity that has been used in social science over the last three or more decades. It has been used in works on economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997); social well-being (Estes 1984); incidence and duration of external intervention into civil wars (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000); interest groups (Muller and Murrell 1986); public sector size (McCarty 1993); human development (Lindenberg 1993); and incidence and severity of genocide (Krain 1997).

The two measures I will employ to capture societal heterogeneity are calculated in the same manner as the ELF60 measure. However, they are available for a greater number of countries and are more up-to-date.

The World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index. This measure is taken from Annett (2000). Calculated exactly the same as the ELF60 index, the World Bank index purports to more accurately measure differences within populations. The diversity scores for many of the countries are not similar to their counterparts in the Krain index. The World Bank index is correlated with Taylor and Hudson at .86 and Krain at .91. Annett’s data source, *The World Christian Encyclopedia*, possesses several advantages. First, it breaks down the world’s ethnolinguistic groups into extremely fine gradations (much more so than does the ELF index). Second, it is fully updated, unlike the Taylor or Krain indices, as all relevant information pertains to the early 1980s. And

[4] For a good discussion of the conceptual and methodological pitfalls of using ELF60 or similar indexes, see Reilly (2000) and Laitin and Posner (2001).

finally, the World Bank measure is available for a larger number of countries (150 in all), although the United Nations does not recognize the independence of many of the additional "countries" in the sample (e.g., Puerto Rico, Guadaloupe).

Two potential disadvantages of this measure are the fact that it is created entirely from one source (*the World Christian Encyclopedia*) and is only available during one time period (1990).

The highest country values for ethnolinguistic diversity variable are .95 (Tanzania), Uganda (.93), Zambia (.91), Kenya (.90), and India (.90). The lowest values are Saudi Arabia (.06), Comoros (.06), Bangladesh (.07), and Seychelles (.08). The mean value for ethnolinguistic diversity is .54.

The World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index. This measure is also assembled by Annett (2000). Also taken from *The World Christian Encyclopedia,* it is calculated just like the other indexes, but measures religious rather than ethnic differences. Apparently the only religious index, it is correlated with the Taylor and Hudson (1972) measure at r=.52. and Krain (1997) at r=.38. This index measures the probability that two individuals chosen from a specific country will not belong to the same religious group, thus capturing the degree of societal fractionalization across the dimension of religion rather than that of ethnolinguistic differences. According to Annett (2000, 13):

> Any religion listed by Barrett as a distinct religion in a given country is included in the index. The only religion that is disaggregated is Christianity: the subdivisions include Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Indigenous Christianity, and Crypto-Christians. Other groupings include Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Tribal religions, Shintoism, Chinese folk religion, as well as a plethora of

minor religions (such as Bahai'i). Furthermore, two secular categories are included: Nonreligious and Atheist.

An obvious shortcoming with this data set is that it does not subdivide major religions other than Christianity. Certainly in the case of Islam, one could argue that the political (if not strictly religious) differences between Sunni and Shi'a are significant enough to merit a distinction between the two.

It should be noted that in an effort to capture the overall effect of societal fractionalization on economic performance, Annett combines the religious and ethnolinguistic indices into a single equally weighted index.

The countries with the highest scores on the religious fractionalization index are Kenya (.79), Ghana (.79), Malawi (.75), Cameroon (.75), and Tanzania (.74). The countries with the lowest fractionalization are Yemen, Tunisia, Oman, and Morocco, all with a score of .01. The mean religious fractionalization score is .37, which is quite a bit lower than the mean of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (.54).

The data for ethnolinguistic and religious diversity for each country in this study are available Appendix B.

b. Dependent Variables

My dependent variables are two types of basic rights: security rights and subsistence rights.

Economic and Subsistence Rights. The first type of rights that I will treat as a dependent variable is subsistence rights, or the degree to which a regime enables its citizens to attain the basic economic necessities common to all people. Subsistence rights can broadly be understood to mean a right to access the following necessities: food,

clothing and shelter; unpolluted air and water; and some minimal degree of public health care. While the quantitative political science literature has largely focused on security or political rights, the means for subsistence must also be available to any individual who expects to lead a normal, healthy, and substantive life.

One way to measure the level of basic subsistence rights is through the use of per capital gross domestic product and gross national product figures. A popular measure of citizens' enjoyment of subsistence rights in a given country is the Heston and Summers (1992) per capita Gross Domestic Product measure.

However, critics rightfully charge that a raw statistic such as gross domestic product does not directly capture the degree to which basic human needs are actually met, since it does not measure the distribution of resources within a society (Morris 1978). Therefore, I will use a measure for subsistence rights that is derived from the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), an indexed measure of the degree to which basic human needs are actually being met. PQLI is one of a series of alternative measures that are designed to give a more accurate picture of the actual state of economic development in a country. The PQLI consists of three components: 1) the number of infant deaths per 1000 live births, 2) life expectancy at age one, and 3) the percentage of the adult population that is literate. Each country is evaluated according to its fulfillment of these three basic needs criteria on a scale of 1 to 100. The source for this index is Morris (1996).

Security Rights. The second set of basic human rights I will include in my analysis are "integrity of the person," "physical integrity rights," or "security rights." The foundation for these rights is the fact that they are basic in the sense that without

them no person can live without being in fear of their personal well-being, safety, and dignity.

Two types of data are available to researchers who wish to study human rights using an empirical, quantitative approach. The first approach is known as the events-based approach, in which a researcher codes all occurrences of human rights violations of a particular type (e.g., torture, murder, imprisonment) are summed for a particular time period (usually monthly or yearly) from newspaper or wire reports. This summed total of events serves as a measure of repression. While events-based approaches have gained a certain level of popularity (e.g., Davenport 1995; Barbieri and Davenport 1997), several criticisms of this approach have been registered in recent years (Stohl et al. 1986; Lopez and Stohl 1992; Milner 1999). One criticism is that few reports of human rights abuses come from closed societies such as North Korea. In other words, a country that does not allow access to the media will not score highly on an events-based repression measure because such abuses are not frequently reported in news sources such as Reuters. This lack of reporting of abuses in relatively closed (or remote) countries will bias their human rights records substantially. Second, there is clearly a Western bias toward the reporting of rights abuses, since most of the wire sources originate in the West. This is not to say that there are no potential benefits to research based on event-based data. Such data, especially when events are parsed from news sources using event count software, may contain fewer types of certain coding errors than do data coded by humans.

For my analysis I will use measures of political and security rights that employ standards-based measures of the human rights situation in a given country. The standards-based approach requires human coders to read reports on the human rights

situation in various countries, and to classify these countries according to predetermined criteria. The advantage of the standards-based approach is that by allowing a degree of informed judgment on the part of coders, researchers are able to avoid the types of systematic bias observed in the events-based approach. However, using a standards-based approach means that human bias will be introduced into the data, reducing the reliability of the measure.

The standards-based measure most applicable to comparative analysis of a large number of countries is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). This is a five-point measure created by coding annually published country human rights reports. To create the PTS measure, coders apply criteria originally developed by Gastil (1980) to information published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department (e.g., Amnesty International 1981; U.S. Department of State 1981). Under the PTS coding scheme, one represents the lowest level of security rights violations and five represents the highest level (for examples of research using PTS, see Stohl and Carleton 1985; Gibney and Dalton 1996; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe 1992; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). Gastil's five levels are:

1) "Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional…political murders are extremely rare."

2) "there is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional…political murder is rare."

3) "There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted…"

4) "The practices of (level 3) are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life…In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas."

5) "The terrors of (level 4) have been expanded to the whole population…the leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals." (Gastil 1980, as quoted in Stohl and Carleton, 1985).

Separate measures exist for the State Department and Amnesty International reports. Although certain political biases may exist in the State Department measure (Innes 1992; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 2001), the presence of an additional measure for the same concept can be useful for capturing more than one dimension of the same phenomenon. The source of these measures is Gibney and Dalton (1996) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999). I use the Amnesty International measure when available. However, in cases where the Amnesty score is not available for a particular country and year, I use the State Department score instead. This substitution appears to be an acceptable solution, as the mean Amnesty Score in my data set is 2.77 and the equivalent score for the State Department measure is 2.83 (the median score for each measure is 3). For a more thorough discussion of the development of this measure and some of the problems associated with its employment, see Milner (1998).

c. Control Variables

A number of factors have been linked to lower levels of government provision of basic rights, particularly security rights, over the years. For this reason, I will use multivariate models that include a number of "control" variables that represent alternative explanations for the level of respect for human rights.

Population. A large population is expected to have a harmful effect on the provision of rights by regimes. Since larger populations lead to a greater strain on resources, governments in highly populated countries may be more likely to repress their citizens in order to suppress the high demand for systemic outputs (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994). The measure for a country's population will be the log of its total natural population, which is available from the Penn World Tables.[5] The logarithmic transformation is employed in order to overcome the skewed distribution of total population that would otherwise hamper the statistical assumptions. To be consistent with previous studies, I hypothesize that *the greater a country's population, the lower the level of subsistence rights and the higher the level of personal integrity violations.* I use the log of the population variable in order to control for heteroskedasticity.

Level of Economic Development. The level of economic development is represented in the models by the level of per capita gross national product (GNP). In keeping with the assumptions of the "baseline" models discussed above (Poe and Tate 1994; Henderson 1991; also see Park 1987), economic development alleviates scarcity, which in turn reduces social strife and demands on the political system. In turn, governments in countries with high levels of economic development are less likely to feel threatened by a lack of order, and will thus not be as likely to resort to repressive measures. Per capita GNP figures are available from the *Penn World Tables*. In accordance with previous research findings, *higher levels of economic development are hypothesized to lead to higher levels of subsistence and lower levels of security rights*

[5] The Penn World Tables Mark 5.6 data set is used for population and per capita GNP figures (© 2000-2001 Alan Heston and Robert Summers, Computing in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Toronto, www.chass.utoronto.ca). [For the rest of the chapter use Penn World Tables].

violations. I use the log of the per capita GNP variable in order to control for heteroskedasticity.

Democracy. It might be hypothesized that democratic regimes are more responsive to demands of their citizens, thus eliminating the motivation for groups or individuals to challenge the authority of the regime. Poe and Tate (1994, 97) argue that democracy may provide an outlet for removing undesirable leaders before they become too threatening to the interests and basic human rights of the population. The measure for democracy in this model will be the Polity III (Gurr 1972) index, a standards-based measure based on institutional characteristics of countries' political systems. The democracy index is an eleven-point measure of the level of conformity of political institutions to accepted democratic standards. Zero represents the lowest level of democracy and ten represents the highest level. In keeping with the findings of previous research, *an increase in the level of democracy is hypothesized to lead to higher levels of subsistence and lower levels of security rights violations.*

Threat to Regime. A new vein of research attempts to understand the relationship between political repression and the type of threat it faces from opposition groups. Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001) hypothesize that regimes will feel more threatened when opposition groups become more active or powerful, and will be more likely to use state terror to stabilize their own power:

> By imprisoning, torturing, and executing persons in opposition to the government…a regime may instill fear in those who might otherwise oppose the government, stifling dissent, and therefore increasing the strength/threat ratio, at least in the short term (2).

In order to capture the concept of threat, the authors create a variable with four categories of threat: 1) nonviolent protest, 2) nonviolent rebellion, 3) violent rebellion, and 4) civil war.[6] This is a standards-based measure taken from three sources: the *Europa Yearbook*, the *Political Handbook of the World*, and the State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. I will treat the data as a five point ordinal scale, with no protest being the lowest value and civil war being the highest. In keeping with the authors, I hypothesize that the severity of threat to a regime from organized opposition groups may be reflected in a country's human rights record. Thus, *higher levels of threat are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of subsistence and higher levels of security rights violations by regimes*. Data are provided by Poe et al. (2001).

Leftist Regime. Another variable that has been hypothesized to affect government respect for human rights is whether a regime is leftist or not. Many, including former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, argue that these regimes are more repressive than right-wing "authoritarian" regimes. Both Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Poe and Tate (1994) find limited

[6] 1. *Nonviolent protest* is described as threat in which "a mostly unarmed opposition regularly confronts the regime over one or more of it policies using demonstrations, riots, and other unconventional forms of political participation to express disagreement."
2. *Nonviolent rebellion* is described as a threat "in which an unarmed opposition pushes for significant change in the constitution or other political institutions through unconventional means not involving violent activities. The difference between nonviolent rebellion and organized nonviolent protest is that in the former the goal of the opposition is more threatening because it pushes for broader institutional or constitutional change in contrast to the latter, in which the opposition seeks narrower, policy change."
3.*Violent rebellion* is described as a threat in which "there is a substantial organized movement which seeks to alter the governmental system, bringing about a significant change in the constitution or other political institutions, through armed attacks, including terrorist activities, guerrilla movements, and most attempted coups, but not civil war."
4. *Civil war* is described as a threat in which, in keeping with Singer and Small (1994) at least 1000 battle deaths result and in which a military government is involved, the national government is a participant in the conflict, and an effective resistance exists. See Poe et al. 2001 for more details.

support for the thesis that leftist regimes are more repressive than other regime types. A leftist regime is defined as one that is governed by a socialist party and does not allow for effective non-socialist opposition. *Leftist regimes are hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of security rights violations.*

However, since leftist regimes are ostensibly guided by a socialist ideology that stresses economic equality and advocates a role for the state in providing for the welfare of its citizens, it appears to make sense to posit that leftist regimes will be more likely to ensure that a society's basic human needs are provided for. Therefore, *leftist regimes are hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of subsistence rights.* Data are taken from Poe and Tate (1994).

British History. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) posit that the relatively decentralized and non-hierarchical nature of British colonial rule may lead governments of former British colonies to rule their citizens in a less authoritarian manner than do regimes in countries without a history of British rule. Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) find that countries with a history of British colonial rule are less likely to violate security rights, *ceteris paribus.* Thus, countries with a British colonial history are hypothesized to have a lower level of subsistence and a higher level of security rights violations. Data are taken from Poe and Tate (1994).

For a list of the variables that will be used in the models, please refer to Appendix A.

3.4 Analytical Techniques

a. Bivariate

The first tool for analyzing the relationship between diversity and human rights is a bivariate analysis of the data. A statistical correlation is a good initial indicator of the direction and strength of the relationship between a dependent and an independent variable. The most common type of bivariate statistical test is the Pearson's r test, which allows for hypothesis testing about whether a given relationship may have occurred by chance or not.

Since the bivariate type of analysis above only tests for linear relationships, it is also possible to find out more about the relationship between diversity and the two measures of human rights using a visual examination of the data. By observing bivariate scatter plots, it is possible to search for nonlinear relationships in the data. It is also possible to look for necessary and sufficient conditions between the independent and dependent variables.

b. Multivariate

In addition, I will perform multivariate cross-sectional analyses of the data. The benefit of a multivariate statistical approach is that many competing explanations for variation in the level of respect for human rights can be evaluated in a single analysis. Thus, it may be possible to observe which factors do the best job of explaining the human rights record in a specific country, when taking into account competing influences.

In addition to a standard single regression predicting security and subsistence rights, this analysis will attempt to isolate direct and indirect effects of diversity through the use of path analysis. It is possible, then, to see the effects of ethnolinguistic and

religious diversity on both human rights measures, both through a direct effect as well as via the effects of other factors. So in addition to the direction and relative impact of diversity, we can see how intervening variables affect the relationship as well.

The path diagrams for these causal models are drawn out in the following two analysis chapters.

3.5 Summary

This chapter has attempted to outline the theoretical linkages between cultural diversity and respect for security and subsistence rights in the developing world.

An attempt was made to identify theoretical links between high levels of diversity and lower levels of subsistence rights in a given country. Two links were identified. The first theoretical position essentially treats cultural groups as any other group, and holds that a greater number of groups placing demands on a regime will lead to a lower level of efficiency in provision of public goods. This, in turn governments are less likely to provide for the right to subsistence, *ceteris paribus*. A second, related theoretical argument is that governments in diverse countries are more likely to feel pressure to appease politically important ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups in society by providing them with resources specifically dedicated toward that group—instead of expending resources in ways that might provide for societal needs in general, such as basic human needs. Thus, higher levels of diversity are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by the citizens in a given country, all other factors held constant.

This chapter also presented a second set of theoretical arguments that attempt to link high levels of cultural diversity to higher levels of security rights violations. The

first reason is that since diverse countries are linked with higher levels of political instability and less likely to be under rule of law, regimes may be more likely to resort to political terror simply because they are more likely to be concerned with political survival than with respecting the right to physical integrity of their country's citizens. The second connection made between diversity and lack of respect for security rights is related to the level of threat to a regime's stability presented by diverse regimes. Regimes in diverse societies may face more organized political opposition from the large number of ethnic and religious groups than would regimes that exist in a more homogenous cultural setting. If leaders feel more threatened by political opposition, they may be more likely to respond with state terror than might otherwise be the case.

Thus, higher levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are hypothesized to lead to higher levels of security rights violations in a given country, all of other factors held constant.

In addition to the theoretical links between diversity and regime respect for human rights, this chapter identified and provided operational definitions for several other variables that have been linked to rights performance, including wealth, population size, British colonial history, leftist regime ideology, democratic openness, and level of threat from opposition groups. The effects of the diversity variables will be empirically examined in the next two chapters. Through the use of graphs, bivariate statistical techniques, multivariate regression techniques, and path analysis, I will test the hypothesis that ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are linked to security and subsistence rights.

The next chapter examines the effects of diversity on the first of the two types of rights: the right to subsistence.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY ON ECONOMIC AND SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS

Efforts to analyze the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and rights will be divided into two separate chapters. This chapter will deal with the relationship between societal heterogeneity and those rights that are collectively termed economic and subsistence rights. Chapter 5 will examine the relationship between diversity and security rights.

The chapter will deal with the relationship between diversity (both ethnolinguistic and religious) and right to subsistence on two levels. The first section will examine the relationship between heterogeneity and economic/subsistence rights through the use of bivariate analyses. The second section will examine the interrelationship of these variables with other potential explanatory variables, and as such will constitute a set of multivariate analyses. A final section will tie the analyses together, providing a detailed discussion of the substantive findings of the chapter.

Bivariate relationships are performed for both 1993 and 1983. Multivariate analyses are performed using data for the year 1993. See Appendix I for multivariate analyses using 1983 data.

4.1 Bivariate Analyses

In order to understand relationships among various data, a good first step is to outline the bivariate relationships between independent and dependent variables. After a visual and statistical exploration of this most basic relationship, one can use multivariate analyses that can statistically control for alternative explanations for why certain bivariate relationships emerge (or do not emerge).

a. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life

The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is the subsistence rights-related indicator to be examined in this chapter. Because this measure is concerned with factors such as health and education, as opposed to aggregate monetary totals, many would argue that PQLI more accurately captures the concepts inherent in the idea of subsistence rights than do per capita Gross National or Gross Domestic Product figures.

An examination of the bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and physical quality of life reveals, at first glance, a rather strong negative link between the two phenomena [Table 4.1]. The Pearson's *r* correlations for the global sample of developing nations for the years 1983 and 1993 are -.36 and -.38, respectively. Both figures are statistically significant at the .05 level. Interestingly, however, not a single region exhibited the same negative, statistically significant pattern. In fact, in only two regions, Africa and South America, is ethnolinguistic diversity negatively correlated with physical quality of life. Furthermore, if Africa is dropped from the analysis, the Pearson's *r* correlation for the global sample for 1993 rises from

-.38 to -.02. Thus, based on statistical correlations alone, one would not be well advised to make any solid conclusion as to any relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and physical quality of life.

Table 4.1 Pearson's Correlations Between Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993.

	r	N
World (1993)	-.38 *	106
World (1983)	-.36 *	103
North America	.27	16
South America	-.56	12
Africa	-.39	42
Middle East/N. Africa	.06	18
Asia/Pacific	.15	18

* = significant at .05 level

Moving on to the scatter plots of this relationship [Figure 4.1], a pattern emerges that suggests a high degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is almost a sufficient condition for a floor value (around .50) for a reasonably high PQLI score (close to .60). Only a five countries appear in the lower left hand quadrant of the scatter plot (the low ethnolinguistic fractionalization-low PQLI quadrant), while 19 countries with a high level of ethnolinguistic diversity (a fractionalization score of greater than .60) have a PQLI score of lower than 50. Is it possible that a high degree of homogeneity militates against low levels of subsistence rights?

There is not a clear answer to this question. If one looks at the world as a global sample, the answer may be 'yes'. However, of the 19 'diverse' (fractionalization scores above .6) countries with PQLI scores below 50 (an arbitrary standard for a minimally acceptable physical quality of life), 17 of those countries are located in Africa. An

examination of the same global scatter plot [Figure 4.2] with African nations excluded reveals no hint of any type of pattern or relationship in the data. In addition, a scatter plot of the same data from 1983 (Africa included) reveals similar results [see Figure 4.3]. In other words, a cluster of diverse countries with low PQLI scores appears in the

Figure 4.1 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993.



lower right quadrant of the graph, but the majority of these are African states. Does this mean that for the world as a whole we should argue that some level of ethnolinguistic homogeneity is a necessary condition for an acceptable PQLI score? If we do not view the African continent as a special case, this appears to be the case.

Is there a noticeable difference between the data for the two time points? A comparison of the scatter plots for 1983 and 1993 [in Figures 4.1 and 4.3] suggests that

while the level of PQLI has increased for countries with both high and low levels of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, the gap between the two types of countries does not change over the 10-year period.

Figure 4.2 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score (Africa Excluded), 1993.



An examination of the cross tabulation of the bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life suggests the possibility that high levels of homogeneity may be a sufficient condition for high levels of subsistence rights. Table 4.2 reveals that of the 54 countries with an ELF score of less than .60, only nine have a PQLI score that is lower than .60. In fact, of the 18 countries that fall into the poorest category of PQLI (less than 45.00), only two, Yemen and Somalia [which are in the two left-most cells on the top row of Table 4.2], have diversity scores below .60.

This is significant because the mean for the religious diversity variable is .54, meaning that 16 of the 18 countries that fall into the worst category of subsistence rights are more diverse than the average country. In contrast, of the 52 countries with ELF scores above .60, 33 (63 percent) suffer from a Physical Quality of Life Index score below 60. The relationship is very clear from a bivariate perspective—citizens in countries with low and medium levels of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity are much more likely to enjoy a moderate or high level of subsistence than their highly diverse counterparts.

Figure 4.3 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1983.



Do regionally separated scatter plots of the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and physical quality of life reveal any additional information? An examination of the visual bivariate relationship in two regions, the Middle East and Africa, may

Table 4.2 Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993.

Physical Quality of Life Index * Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Crosstabulation

			Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization					
			1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
Physical Quality of Life Index	1.00	Count	1	1		11	5	18
		% of Total	.9%	.9%		10.4%	4.7%	17.0%
	2.00	Count	3	3	1	8	9	24
		% of Total	2.8%	2.8%	.9%	7.5%	8.5%	22.6%
	3.00	Count	8	6	5	3	3	25
		% of Total	7.5%	5.7%	4.7%	2.8%	2.8%	23.6%
	4.00	Count	5	6	15	12	1	39
		% of Total	4.7%	5.7%	14.2%	11.3%	.9%	36.8%
Total		Count	17	16	21	34	18	106
		% of Total	16.0%	15.1%	19.8%	32.1%	17.0%	100.0%

Crosstabs. (For ELF Index, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 to 80, 5=. 81 and higher) (For PQLI, 1= 0 to 45, 2= 45.01 to 60, 3=60.1 to 75, 4= 75.01 to 90)

provide an answer to this question, as possible patterns among the data were detected. The Middle East [Figure 4.4] is an example of a region that does not reveal a pattern in the relationship between the two phenomena. In fact, except for two outlying countries with very low PQLI scores (Afghanistan and Yemen), and one country with a somewhat higher score (Israel), all of the Middle Eastern countries are spread out across a very narrow range (from about 60 to the low 80s) on the PQLI measure, despite their wide range of diversity scores. So in the case of the Middle East, no relationship is observable between ethnolinguistic diversity and PQLI.

In contrast to the Middle East, Africa is the region that exhibits a strong bivariate negative bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and physical quality of life. Does a visual examination of the scatter plot of this region reinforce this finding of a negative relationship? A scatter plot of African countries [Figure 4.5] reveals that a vast cluster of the total number of countries lies in the lower left-hand (the very high

Figure 4.4 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score (Middle East Only), 1993.



diversity-very low PQLI) quadrant. In the African case, there are no highly diverse countries with Physical Quality of Life Scores above 70. The only three African countries to achieve a PQLI score of above 70 are Botswana, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, all of which have an ethnolinguistic fractionalization score of .48 or lower. The large cluster of diverse, poor countries means that in Africa there is not a clearly identifiable linear negative relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and physical quality of life.

Thus, an analysis of the bivariate scatter plots of the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and physical quality of life reveals little about the possible

Figure 4.5 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score (Africa Only), 1993.



nature of some underlying relationship inherent in the data. Neither a conditional (necessary or sufficient) pattern, nor some other type of nonlinear pattern can be seen in the data. What does arise from an analysis of this data is that, generally speaking, there is neither a strong relationship at the aggregate level nor within any individual continent when examining this bivariate relationship. The exception is the large number of very diverse, very low-PQLI countries in the African continent. These countries stand out so much that perhaps they require some sort of separate type of analysis in order to determine whether the extremely low levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by the citizens in these countries is in some way a result of their high level of diversity, or if it is caused by some other common factor or set of common factors.

b. Religious Fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life

The chapter now moves to an analysis of the bivariate relationship between religious diversity and physical quality of life. As is the case with the previous analysis, the relationship does not necessarily appear to be the same across regions. For a global sample of developing nations for the year 1993, the statistical relationship between religious fractionalization and PQLI is negative (r= -.22) and statistically significant at the .05 level [see Table 4.3]. The relationship is also negative when 1983 data are used, but is not quite as strong (r= -.14) and is not statistically significant. Interestingly, although the global relationship is negative, only the Middle East/North Africa region (r= -.18) replicates this relationship at the regional level. The other regions produce positive relationships, two of which, North America (r= .43), and Asia (r= .48) are both rather sizable and statistically significant at the .05 level. In the other two regions, South America (r= .28) and Africa (r=.15), a positive relationship emerges, but is neither statistically significant at the .05 level nor (especially in the case of Africa) particularly strong.

Table 4.3 Pearson's Correlations Between Religious Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993.

	r	N
World (1993)	-.22 *	105
World (1983)	-.14	103
North America	.43 *	16
South America	.28	12
Africa	.15	42
Middle East/N. Africa	-.18	18
Asia	.48 *	17

* = significant at .05 level

This finding appears to be puzzling, since one would not expect a different relationship in the global data set than in its constituent parts. In addition, the Middle East region (the only one in which the relationship was negative) consists of only 12 countries in this study, which would appear to make it unlikely that the relationship found in this region would strongly impact the overall direction of the statistical relationship.

What accounts for this seemingly odd finding? The answer seems to lie in the fact that within regions countries tend to be clustered rather closely to one another, but that there is great variation in where those countries are clustered across regions. An examination of the scatter plot of the relationship between religious diversity and PQLI scores for the year 1993 [Figure 4.6] reveals two notable sets of clusters, one in the upper

Figure 4.6 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993.



left hand corner of the graph (the low fractionalization-high PQLI quadrant), and one on the bottom right hand corner (the high fractionalization-low PQLI quadrant). Figure 4.6 also reveals that many more countries with religious fractionalization scores below .40 have PQLI scores above 60 than below this figure. Conversely, it appears that in countries with religious fractionalization scores below .40, there is not much difference between the number of countries with PQLI scores above and below 60. The scatter plot of the relationship between fractionalization and PQLI reveals no nonlinear pattern in the data.

In fact, an inspection of Table 4.4 reveals that 32 (30.4 percent) of the 105 cases fall into the 'low religious fractionalization-high PQLI' category, defined by having a

Table 4.4 Cross Tabulations of the Bivariate Relationship Between Religious Fractionalization and PQLI, 1993.

Physical Quality of Life Index * Religious Fractionalization Crosstabulation

			Religious Fractionalization				
			1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	Total
Physical Quality of Life Index	1.00	Count	5	3	4	6	18
		% of Total	4.8%	2.9%	3.8%	5.7%	17.1%
	2.00	Count	3	4	4	13	24
		% of Total	2.9%	3.8%	3.8%	12.4%	22.9%
	3.00	Count	14	2	1	7	24
		% of Total	13.3%	1.9%	1.0%	6.7%	22.9%
	4.00	Count	18	7	7	7	39
		% of Total	17.1%	6.7%	6.7%	6.7%	37.1%
Total		Count	40	16	16	33	105
		% of Total	38.1%	15.2%	15.2%	31.4%	100.0%

Crosstabs. (For REL Index, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 and higher)
(For PQLI, 1= 0 to 45, 2= 45.01 to 60, 3=60.1 to 75, 4= 75.01 to 90)

religious fractionalization score of .20 or less and a PQLI score of greater than 60. Meanwhile, 19 cases (18.3 percent of the total) fall into the category of 'high religious fractionalization-low PQLI (which is defined as a religious fractionalization score above

.60 and a PQLI score below .60). So it appears as if some of the data have separated into these two distinct categories. Moreover, the graph of the same relationship for the year 1983 appears to be almost identical to the 1993 graph. Does this separation hold across regions?

When the sample is broken down into regions, it becomes apparent that the answer may be 'no'. In three regions—North America, South America, and the Middle East—countries tend to cluster in the aforementioned low fractionalization-high PQLI quadrant. Interestingly, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that in the North American and South American cases, almost identical curvilinear forms can be observed, centering around the upper-left hand (high PQLI low religious fractionalization) quadrant. What the substantive implications for this pattern might be is not clear.

Figure 4.7 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and PQLI Score (North America Only), 1993.



In both North and South America, the countries with the worst physical quality of life tend to be the more diverse ones. In North America, the six countries with religious diversity scores below .20 (Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico) all are among the seven poorest countries in the region. Likewise, in South America, three of the four countries with the worst PQLI have religious diversity scores of .14 or less (they include Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia). Brazil and Haiti are the two cases in North and South America that are somewhat more diverse but still have extremely poor levels of subsistence rights.

Figure 4.8 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and PQLI Score (South America Only), 1993.



In the Africa-only scatter plot [Figure 4.9], on the other hand, the bulk of countries fall into the high fractionalization-low PQLI part of the graph. At the extremes of PQLI, one sees that the two countries with the best PQLI (Mauritius and Seychelles)

are very different in terms of their level of religious diversity, as the former scores highly on the religious fractionalization index and the latter has a rather low score. In any case, both cases are not typical of African countries, since they are island nations. Among the countries with the worst PQLI scores there is also a broad range of religious diversity represented. There is enough of a U-shape in the graph to suggest that perhaps there is some curvilinear effect in the African case, where countries with high and low levels of religious diversity tend to have higher levels of subsistence than those countries that fall into the middle range of diversity.

Figure 4.9 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and PQLI Score (Africa Only), 1993.



Aside from this tendency for countries to cluster within regions, no linear or nonlinear relationship can be observed in global scatter plots of the relationship between religious diversity and physical quality of life for the years 1983 or 1993. Thus, although some type of relationship may exist at the aggregate level, it cannot be replicated within continents. Thus Africa, for instance, weights the overall relationship in a negative direction despite the fact that the relationship in this region is actually positive. In order to make some sort of pronouncement that religious diversity is conducive to higher levels of subsistence rights, one would first need to explain why such a relationship does not generally exist at the regional level. A more important factor may be what continent a country lies in.

4.2 Multivariate Analyses

a. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Subsistence Rights

The first part of this chapter investigated the bivariate relationship between cultural heterogeneity and provision of subsistence rights. The current section will attempt to better understand this relationship through the use of multivariate analytical techniques.

A beginning step for a multivariate analysis is to create a model that incorporates many alternative explanations for why a phenomenon occurs into a single equation. For guidance, this paper will use a similar analysis performed by Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999). While that model attempted to explain variation in security rights performance, it is possible to create the same type of model to predict the level of subsistence rights enjoyed by a given country's citizens. A noticeable omission in this explanatory model is the variable for British colonial influence. It is not included

because of a lack of theoretical or empirical grounds for a relationship between a British colonial history and the level of subsistence rights.[1]

The model will be estimated as:

$$PQLI = \alpha + (\log)\hat{a}_1 PCGNP + \hat{a}_2 DEMOC3 + \hat{a}_3 THREAT + (\log)\hat{a}_4 POP + \hat{a}_5 LEFT + \hat{a}_6 WBELF + \varepsilon$$

Where:

PQLI= Physical Quality of Life Index Score.

PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product.

THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from '1' (nonviolent protest) to '4' (civil war).

POP= Population.

LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type.

WBELF= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score.

See table 4.5 below for a description of each variable in the model, along with the anticipated effects on the level of subsistence. For more discussion of the variables, including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer to the description of the variables in Chapter Three.

Table 4.6 presents the results of a multivariate model that predicts physical quality of life. When examining the model as a whole, the adjusted R-Squared is .60, which means that approximately 60 percent of the variation in Physical Quality of Life can be explained by this model. By comparison, when the same model is run without

[1] However, note that British colonial history will be included in the model for security rights that will be developed in Chapter V.

Table 4.5 Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of Subsistence Rights (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included), 1993.

Variable	Description	Effect	Source
PCGNP	Log of Gross National Product, Lagged one Time Period	Positive	Penn World Tables
DEMOC3	Polity 3 Democracy Score	Positive	Polity III
POP	Log of Population Lagged one Time Period	Negative	Penn World Tables
LEFT	Presence of Leftist Government	Positive	Poe, Tate, Keith (1999)
THREAT	Threat to Regime, Lagged one Time Period	Negative	Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001)
WBELF	World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Score	Negative	Annett (2000)

ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the adjusted R-Squared only drops to .58 (from .60), which suggests that the overall direct impact of ethnolinguistic diversity on subsistence rights is not very large. An F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that the model's coefficients are zero, which rejects the possibility that the model's effects occurred due to chance. A Klein tests reveals no hint of multicollinearity in the model.

Table 4.6 Multivariate Regression of Subsistence Rights, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged)	9.34	1.23	.000	.64 *
Democracy	1.20	.30	.000	.28 *
Threat (lagged)	-.78	.93	.401	-.07
(Log)Population (lagged)	1.99	.86	.024	.18 *
Leftist Regime	10.97	5.12	.035	.16 *
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-11.35	5.20	.032	-.17 *

* = p<.05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (6, 79) = 22.26
Adjusted R-Squared = .60
Root Mean Square Error= 10.882
Prob > F = 0.0000

Moving to an analysis of the individual regressors, the first variable included in the model is wealth, as measured by per capita GNP. As hypothesized, it is positively

correlated with high levels of subsistence rights, *ceteris paribus* (all other factors held constant). The coefficient for per capita GNP is statistically significant at the .05 level.

The second independent variable is level of democratic openness, as measured by the Polity III democracy score. As hypothesized, democracy is positively correlated with higher levels of PQLI when all other model variables are held at their statistical means. The coefficient is statistically significant.

Third, the level of threat faced by a regime is not correlated either positively or negatively with physical quality of life. The hypothesis that higher levels of ethnolinguistic diversity are associated with lower levels of subsistence is not confirmed by the data.

Population has a somewhat surprising effect, as it is positively associated with high levels of PQLI, *ceteris paribus*. The coefficient for population is statistically significant at the .05 level. This relationship does not occur in the hypothesized direction, indicating that large populations may not be incompatible with high levels of achievement when all other variables are taken into consideration.

The leftist regime variable had the expected effect, as countries with leftist governments were correlated with higher levels of subsistence rights, *ceteris paribus*. The coefficient for leftist regime type is statistically significant at the .05 level. Leftist regime type, then, warrants inclusion in a multivariate causal model of subsistence rights.

Finally, the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization was negative and statistically significant. In other words, higher levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity are associated with lower levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by a country's citizens. This effect is in the hypothesized direction.

To briefly summarize the model of subsistence rights, Table 4.6 reveals that all of the variables except level of threat to the regime from organized opposition have a statistically significant impact on Physical Quality of Life. Wealth, democratic openness, population size, and leftist regime type were all positively correlated with high levels of Physical Quality of Life, while ethnolinguistic diversity was the only variable that had a statistically significant negative effect.

The *relative* impact of ethnolinguistic diversity (beta = -.17), as measured by the World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, was about the same as the effect of population (beta=.18) and leftist regime type (beta = .16), and slightly over one-half that of democracy (beta = .28). However, the driving factor in the model is clearly the level of wealth in a country. With a statistically significant beta coefficient of .64, the relative impact of per capita Gross National Product is more than twice that of any other variable in the model.

Thus, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with lower levels of subsistence rights when all other variables in the model are held constant. Holding other potential explanatory factors at their statistical means, countries that are more diverse are less likely to provide a high level of subsistence to their citizens. This might lead a researcher to provisionally conclude that ethnolinguistic diversity should be included among the list of factors that negatively affect subsistence rights.

While this initial finding is interesting, it remains possible that a path analytical approach may reveal more about the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is done by creating a causal model that tests explicit linkages between causal factors. One useful first step in this direction is to drop variables in the original

multivariate model that were not found to be statistically significant. In this case, the domestic threat variable is not statistically significant. This variable will be dropped, and the equation will be re-estimated.

Table 4.7 Multivariate Regression of Physical Quality of Life (Domestic Threat Variable Omitted), 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged)	9.71	1.15	.000	.67 *
Democracy	1.95	.30	.000	.28 *
(Log) Population (lagged)	1.74	.81	.034	.16 *
Leftist Regime	11.70	5.03	.023	.17 *
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-11.24	5.19	.033	-.17 *

* = p<.05 (one-tailed) Adjusted R-Squared = .60
N=86 Root Mean Square Error= 10.863
F (5, 80) = 26.66 Prob > F = 0.0000

When the domestic threat variable is dropped, very little changes in the model. One can see in Table 4.7 that the coefficients do not change very much, as the goodness of fit improves only slightly, as the adjusted R-Squared remains unchanged at .60 and the root mean squared error decreases by only a tiny amount.

Figure 4.10 is a path diagram of the causal linkages between the variables in the multivariate model of subsistence rights. It specifies linkages between the variables in the model, along with a specified direction of each relationship. In all cases, the variables in the regression model above are hypothesized to have the same effects in this causal model. However, indirect linkages are also specified in order to capture the indirect effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on security rights. This causal model, then, is a way to better specify the relationship between diversity and security rights by specifying a logical causal ordering for the variables in the regression above.

In the causal model, three variables—ethnolinguistic fractionalization, population, and leftist regime—can be considered to be exogenous. That is, none of the other model variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly. While one of these three exogenous variables, leftist regime, can not be hypothesized to have an effect on any other variables in the model, it is plausible that the other two, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and population, may affect two of the other model variables—wealth and democracy. Thus, in addition to having a direct effect on security rights, ethnolinguistic diversity may indirectly affect security rights through its effect on these other two variables. In keeping with the theoretical treatment above that links diversity to inferior social outcomes, ethnolinguistic diversity is hypothesized to lower the level of wealth and democracy. To be consistent with the generally negative theoretical work and empirical research, population size is also hypothesized to lead to lower levels of wealth and democracy.

This causal model can be estimated by working backwards. Initially, subsistence rights is the dependent variable, and all of the other model variables are considered to be independent. The two model variables that are considered to be endogenous to population size and ethnolinguistic fractionalization—per capita GNP and democracy—are treated as dependent variables in auxiliary regressions. The direction and relative strength of each of the relationship can be obtained from the beta weights in each regression. Following Tan (1998), only the links that are statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed) will be drawn in the estimated model. It will be this model that will produce the direct effects necessary for the causal model that is estimated in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.10 Causal Model of Subsistence Rights (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included), 1993.



Below, Tables 4.8 and 4.9 are the remaining equations that must be estimated in order to derive the indirect effects for a causal model of subsistence rights that uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization as one of the explanatory variables. Table 4.8 estimates the effects of population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization on per capita GNP. Table 4.9 reveals the effects of population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the level of democracy.

Table 4.8 Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-440.04	189.30	.022	-.23 *
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-2123.93	1401.76	.133	-.15 *

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=103

Table 4.9 Regression of Democracy, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-.15	.29	.619	-.06
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-1.46	1.80	.418	-.09

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=87

Figure 4.11 is the fully estimated causal model that shows both the direct and indirect effects of the model variables on physical quality of life. For instance, ethnolinguistic diversity has a direct negative effect (beta= -.17) on physical quality of life. However, it also has an indirect effect on physical quality of life because higher levels of diversity correspond to lower levels of per capita G.N.P., which in turn is found to be associated with a higher PQLI score. To calculate this indirect effect, it is necessary simply to multiply the coefficient between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and per capita GNP (-.15) with the coefficient that links per capita GNP to physical quality of life (.67). The product of these two coefficients is -.10, which is the indirect effect of diversity on physical quality of life. If we sum the beta weights of the direct (-.17) and indirect (-.10), we find that the total effect is -.27.

Table 4.10 reveals the direction and relative impact of each of the factors in the PQLI model. The effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on Physical Quality of Life is

Figure 4.11 Causal Model of Subsistence Rights (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included), 1993.



negative (beta = -.27), when taking into account its impact through the rest of the variables in the model. The impact of ethnolinguistic diversity can be broken down into direct and indirect effects. The direct effect (beta = -.17) is somewhat larger than the indirect effect (beta = -.10) that occurs via lowered per capita GNP due to fractionalization.

Table 4.10 Direct and Indirect Effects of Model Variables on Subsistence Rights, 1993.

	Direct	Indirect	Total
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (log)	.67	N/A	.67
Democracy	.28	N/A	.28
Population (log)	.16	-.15 (via GNP)	.01
Leftist regime	.17	N/A	.17
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-.17	-.10 (via GNP)	-.27

Notably, all of the other variables have a positive effect on PQLI. The absolute value of the effect of wealth (beta=.67) is about two and one-half times that of the magnitude of ethnolinguistic diversity. The total effect of democracy (.28) is of about the same magnitude as that of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, but occurs in the opposite direction. The magnitudes of the effects of leftist regime type (.17) and population (.01) are substantially smaller than that of ethnolingustic diversity.

Thus, in a multivariate causal model that includes both direct and indirect effects, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has negative impact on subsistence rights. The effect is exacerbated by the indirect effect via a reduction in wealth, which in turn leads to lower levels of subsistence.

b. Religious Fractionalization and Subsistence Rights

What additional information can we learn about the relationship between religious fractionalization and subsistence rights using multivariate analytical techniques? In order to answer this question, a model of security rights violations with religious fractionalization as an independent variable will be tested. The model will be estimated as:

$$PQLI = \alpha + (\log)\hat{a}_1 PCGNP + \hat{a}_2 DEMOC3 + \hat{a}_3 THREAT + (\log)\hat{a}_4 POP + \hat{a}_5 LEFT + \hat{a}_6 WBREL + \varepsilon$$

Where:

PQLI= Physical Quality of Life Index Score.

PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product.

THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from '1' (nonviolent protest) to '4' (civil war).

POP= Population.

LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type.

WBREL= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score.

See table 4.11 below for a description of each variable in the model. For more discussion of the variables, including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer to the description of the variables in Chapter Three.

Table 4.11 Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of Subsistence Rights (Including Religious Fractionalization), 1993.

Variable	Description	Anticipated Effect	Data Source
PCGNP	Log of Gross National Product, Lagged one Time Period	Positive	Penn World Tables
DEMOC3	Polity 3 Democracy Score	Positive	Polity III
POP	Log of Population Lagged one Time Period	Negative	Penn World Tables
LEFT	Presence of Leftist Government	Positive	Poe, Tate, Keith (1999)
THREAT	Threat to Regime, Lagged one Time Period	Negative	Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001)
WBREL	World Bank Religious Fractionalization Score	Negative	Annett (2000)

Table 4.12 presents the results of a regression predicting physical quality of life that includes religious rather than ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The adjusted R-Squared measure of goodness of fit shows that the model can explain about 58 percent of the variation in the Physical Quality of Life measure. The goodness-of-fit statistics in this model are slightly worse than in the model for ethnolinguistic fractionalization above (see Table 4.6), as the R-Squared decreases from .60 to .58, and the mean squared error is slightly higher. The model as a whole is statistically significant, as indicated by the joint F-test statistic.

Table 4.12 Multivariate Regression of Subsistence Rights, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged)	10.36	1.28	.000	.71 *
Democracy	1.22	.32	.000	.29 *
Threat (lagged)	-.71	.97	.464	-.06
(Log)Population (lagged)	1.67	.88	.062	.15 *
Leftist Regime	12.07	5.24	.024	.15 *
Religious Fractionalization	.50	5.10	.922	.01

* = p<.05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (6, 79) = 20.25

Adjusted R-Squared = .58
Root Mean Square Error= 11.205
Prob > F = 0.0000

All of the control variables except threat (which is not statistically significant), and population size (which has a statistically significant positive effect) have effects that are in the expected direction and statistically significant. Most notably as regards this research effort, however, the model finds that religious fractionalization does not have a statistically significant effect on the PQLI variable. In fact, it has a tiny beta coefficient

(.01), and does not even come remotely close to being statistically significant.[2] The direct effect of religious fractionalization does not appear to have much, if any of a direct effect on the PQLI score. This is further borne out by the fact that when religious diversity is dropped from the model, the adjusted R-Squared does not improve at all, and the mean squared error only drops by a tiny amount (regression not shown).

At this point, one might reasonably conclude that the level of religious diversity in a country does not appear to have a meaningful impact on the level of subsistence rights. After all, it does not have a sizable direct effect in a multivariate model. However, since religious fractionalization is the variable of interest here, it is desirable to know as much as possible about its effects in a multivariate context. It may be sensible to take a brief look at how religious fractionalization plays out even though it does not have a direct effect on subsistence rights. Religious diversity is included as a variable in a multivariate causal model in order to test for its *indirect* effect on security rights. The first step is to drop the threat to regime variable, because it is also not statistically significant in the original model.

Figure 4.12 is a fully estimated model of subsistence rights after the domestic threat variable is removed. This regression is not shown. The supplementary regressions for Per Capita G.N.P. and Democracy, which are needed in order to calculate the indirect effects of religious fractionalization, are also not displayed. The model reveals that religious fractionalization does indeed appear to affect physical quality of life, although

[2] Interestingly, if per capita G.N.P. is not logged in the model, religious fractionalization has a negative and statistically significant effect on PQLI. This effect is in the hypothesized direction. However, in order to control for the possibility of unit-related heteroskedasticity, it appears to be wise to log the per capita G.N.P. variable.

Figure 4.12 Causal Model of Subsistence Rights (Religious Fractionalization Included), 1993.



indirectly. It does so in two ways. First, by negatively affecting the level of per capita Gross National Product, it leads indirectly to lower subsistence rights. Second, higher levels of religious fractionalization lead to lower levels of democracy, which also in turn leads to lower levels of PQLI.

Table 4.13 summarizes the direct and indirect effects of the model variables. Again, the variable with the biggest relative impact is wealth, which has an effect (beta=.74) that is more than two and one-half times more than that of any other variable. This effect is in the expected direction, meaning that wealth and high levels of subsistence are highly correlated with one another. Democracy, population and regime type also have effects in the hypothesized direction.

Table 4.13 Direct and Indirect Effects of Model Variables on Subsistence Rights, 1993.

	Direct	Indirect	Total
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (log)	.74	N/A	.74
Democracy	.29	N/A	.29
Leftist Regime	.19	N/A	.19
Population (log)	.13	-.20 (via GNP)	-.07
Religious Fractionalization	---	-.16 (via GNP) -.05 (via democ.)	-.21

The variable of primary interest, religious fractionalization, has negative indirect effects that sum to a beta weight of -.21. This effect is somewhat smaller than that of democracy, and only slightly larger than that of leftist regime type. Again, there is no direct effect of religious diversity on subsistence rights. Rather, its effects come indirectly because it is associated with lower levels of wealth and democracy. The indirect effect of religious diversity, then, is to lower the levels of subsistence rights by lowering the level of two variables that are associated with higher levels of subsistence rights. The indirect effects of religious fractionalization on the dependent variable through lowering GDP is -.16, more than three times larger in absolute value than the impact through democracy (-.05). When looking at the total impact of religious fractionalization in a causal model that includes both direct and indirect effects, its

relative effect is far smaller than that of wealth, and somewhat smaller than that of level of democracy. But its effect is slightly higher than that of leftist regime type, and three times that of population. When one takes into account the overall effect of religious diversity, its total impact is similar to that of ethnolinguistic diversity in Table 4.10 above.

In short, religious diversity appears to exhibit a downward effect on the level of subsistence rights, but these effects are filtered through two other variables---wealth and democratic openness. A standard regression does not identify a meaningful effect of religious diversity, but this path analytical model suggests that researchers need to consider religious diversity as an explanatory variable in an attempt to predict subsistence rights in a given country.

4.3 Summary of Results

The relationship between cultural heterogeneity in a country and the level of subsistence enjoyed by its citizens is largely unexplored. Aside from rough statistical analyses, there has been little empirical work on this topic in the social sciences. The analyses of this chapter have produced a number of interesting, albeit preliminary, research findings:

First, a simple bivariate analysis of a global sample of developing nations in the years 1983 and 1993 reveals that higher levels of both ethnolinguistic and religious diversity in a country are associated with lower enjoyment of the right to subsistence, as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index. This negative relationship is found to be slightly stronger for ethnolinguistic diversity than for religious diversity. Why this might

be the case is a subject of possible future research. One possible explanation is that there is more variation in the ethnolinguistic measure than in the religious one. In other words, the statistical relationship may be stronger in the case of ethnolinguistic diversity because it has a greater range of values than does religious diversity. In addition, a visual examination of the relationships between both types of diversity and PQLI reveals no evidence of any conditional (i.e., necessary or sufficient) relationship between diversity and physical quality of life.

A second notable finding of the analyses in this chapter is that the effects of diversity on subsistence rights appear to vary quite widely across different regions of the world. In the case of Africa, most of the countries fall into the high diversity-low PQLI quadrant of a scatter plot of the bivariate relationship. In the Middle East/North Africa and Asian regions, no relationship of any type emerged in the data. Bivariate scatter plots of the relationship between religious fractionalization and PQLI in 1993 are remarkably similar in the North and South American cases. However, they bear little resemblance to each other when ethnolinguistic fractionalization is used as the measure of diversity. In short, it is difficult to detect common patterns in the relationship between diversity and PQLI in bivariate scatter plots of the different regions can detect few common patterns across regions.

Third, a multivariate analysis based on a global sample of developing nations in 1993 strengthens the bivariate finding that ethnolinguistic diversity is associated with lower levels of PQLI. When included as an explanatory variable with a series of other variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a net effect that is about as strong as that of population and leftist regime type, though it is weaker than the effects of wealth and

democracy, as measured by beta weights. In a causal model that captures both direct and indirect effects, ethnolinguistic diversity is still found to negatively impact physical quality of life, although its net effect remains weaker than that of wealth and level of democracy. The negative direct effect is augmented by the indirect effect it has on PQLI via its negative impact on the level of per capita GNP. Essentially, the other variables in the multivariate causal had the hypothesized effects.

Fourth, using data from 1993, religious diversity is also found to have a statistically significant negative effect when included in a multivariate model with other variables hypothesized to affect physical quality of life. Notably, in contrast to the effect of ethnolinguistic diversity, the effect of religious fractionalization does not have a direct statistically significant effect on subsistence rights. In fact, wealth, democracy, and threat to regime all have a higher level of impact on the PQLI than does religious diversity. This is because of the sizable *indirect* effects of religious diversity—it leads to lower PQLI due to the fact that it lowers wealth and level of democracy. Thus, the total effects of religious and ethnolinguistic diversity are found to be relatively similar in the final analysis. The direct impact of other model variables on PQLI is in the predicted direction. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, it is possible to say that this chapter supports the contention that religious diversity leads to lower levels of subsistence.

In short, both bivariate (using 1983 and 1993 data) and multivariate analyses (using 1993 data) lend evidence to the hypothesis that cultural diversity is somehow related to lower physical quality of life within a given country. While the reasons for this harmful impact are surely the subject of future research, this chapter hints that one possible reason for this relationship is that more diverse countries tend to be poorer. In

turn, poverty is usually associated with lower enjoyment of subsistence rights in a given country.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY ON SECURITY RIGHTS

This chapter will examine the relationship between cultural diversity and its effects on personal integrity or security rights. As was the case in the previous chapter, it will examine the effects of both ethnolinguistic and religious diversity. The first section will present analyses of the bivariate relationship between diversity and security rights, including both statistical correlations and scatter plots. The second section will include multivariate analyses that include ethnolinguistic and religious diversity as explanatory factors, along with several competing factors that are purported to be related to personal integrity abuse in some manner. The chapter will conclude with a summary discussion of the findings.

Analyses are performed using the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale measure for the years 1983 and 1993. Consult Appendix I for results obtained when using the State Department data.

5.1 Bivariate Analyses

In order to understand how cultural diversity and security rights interact, a bivariate analysis is a good starting point in which to analyze the relationship. A subsequent section will analyze the relationship in a more complex, multivariate context.

a. Ethnolinguistic Diversity and Security Rights

The first bivariate relationship to be examined is the one between ethnolinguistic diversity and the provision of security rights. Table 5.1 reveals that the Pearson's *r* correlation between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations for the year 1993 is .22 and statistically significant. In other words, for the global sample of 105 developing nations, an increase in the level of diversity corresponds to a higher level of security rights violations. The relationship is only slightly weaker for the same relationship in 1983, at .20. The moderate strength of this relationship is generally borne out when the same bivariate correlations are calculated at the regional level. In all but one region, North America, ethnolinguistic diversity is positively correlated with security rights violations. However, the relationship is only statistically significant in the case of the Asia and Pacific region. In a test of the impacts of omitted regions on the overall effect, the removal of either Africa or Asia from the sample causes the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and personal integrity violations to lose statistical

Table 5.1 Pearson's Correlations Between Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.

	r	N
North America	-.16	16
South America	.36	12
Africa	.18	42
Middle East/N. Africa	.01	18
Asia/Pacific	.49 *	18
World (1993)	.22 *	106
World (1983)	.20 *	105

* = significant at .05 level

significance. The rather low number of countries in the global sample might help to explain why statistical significance is so difficult to achieve in an analysis of ethnic fractionalization and security rights.

Because the Pearson's *r* correlation assumes that both variables are continuous, it may be wise to include a measure of strength of the bivariate relationship that are designed for when one of the variables is ordinal in nature (in this case, the Amnesty International score). The appropriate measures in this situation are Kendall's tau-b and Spearman's rho. The strength of the relationship found by these measures is relatively similar to what was found using a Pearson's *r* correlation. The correlation between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations using the tau-b correlation is slightly lower than the Pearson's *r* statistic, at .18, while the correlation using Spearman's rho is .24, which is slightly higher than the Pearson's *r* coefficient. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Moving to a visual inspection of the bivariate relationship [See Figure 5.1], a scatter plot for the 1993 data reveals that there are relatively few countries that fall into the upper-left and lower-right corners of the graph. This means that there is an absence of countries with very high levels of homogeneity that fall into the highest category of violations, as well as a lack of countries with very high ethnolinguistic diversity that fall into the lowest category. Beyond this finding, there is little to notice about the pattern of countries that emerges, except that countries generally fall into almost every part of the graph. In other words, there is no evidence of any clear linear or nonlinear pattern in the data, or any type of necessary or sufficient condition.

Figure 5.1 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.



By comparison, an analysis of the scatter plots for the same relationship for the year 1983 [Figure 5.2] reveals a similar lack of a clear pattern in the data. Certainly, as is the case with 1993, there is a clear lack of countries with low levels of diversity and high security rights violations. Considering the fact that only five of the 104 nations in the bivariate analysis had the highest level of violations (i.e., a score of 5), one should not draw any strong conclusions from this finding.

Moving to cross tabulations of the relationship, Table 5.2 divides the sample of countries into five parts, based on their level of ethnolinguistic diversity. A cross-tabulation reveals that no countries that experience the highest level of violations have an ethnolinguistic fractionalization score of less than .20. Likewise, there are no countries

Figure 5.2 **Bivariate Scatter Plots of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1983.**



Table 5.2 **Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.**

Amnesty International Score * Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Crosstabulation

			Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization					
			1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
Amnesty International Score	1.00	Count	6	3	8	3		20
		% of Total	5.7%	2.8%	7.5%	2.8%		18.9%
	2.00	Count	2	4	5	12	5	28
		% of Total	1.9%	3.8%	4.7%	11.3%	4.7%	26.4%
	3.00	Count	6	2	5	6	8	27
		% of Total	5.7%	1.9%	4.7%	5.7%	7.5%	25.5%
	4.00	Count	3	5	2	7	2	19
		% of Total	2.8%	4.7%	1.9%	6.6%	1.9%	17.9%
	5.00	Count		2	1	6	3	12
		% of Total		1.9%	.9%	5.7%	2.8%	11.3%
Total		Count	17	16	21	34	18	106
		% of Total	16.0%	15.1%	19.8%	32.1%	17.0%	100.0%

Values for Table: For ELF, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 to 80, 5=.81 to .99
For Security Rights violations, 1= Lowest (Best), 5= Highest (Worst)

with a fractionalization score above .80 that fall into the best (lowest) category of violations. Aside from this finding, countries appear across the range of possible values, with no clear pattern. The highest concentration of countries observable in the table is in those countries with ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores from .60 to .99 and Amnesty scores of 2 or 3. In these four cells lie 29.2 percent of all of the countries, signifying a large cluster of countries in the relatively diverse-fairly good security rights category. Thus, no strong findings emerge from a bivariate analysis of the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations. One notable pattern in the data is that ethnically and linguistically homogeneous countries do not commonly have the worst security rights scores. The overall statistical relationship is a weak positive relationship between security rights violations and ethnolinguistic diversity.

As with subsistence rights, one can observe no common pattern in the scatter plots of this relationship when broken down by region. One example of a clear concentration of countries within a particular level of diversity and level of respect for security rights occurs in the case of Africa. Figure 5.3 displays the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations for the African region. In Africa a high concentration of countries fall into the area of the graph where ethnolinguistic fractionalization is above .70 and the Amnesty score is two or three. In fact, 20 of the 42 African countries have both Amnesty scores of two or three and ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores above .60.

However, one cannot make any strong conclusions regarding the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and a regime's propensity to violate the rights of its citizens based *solely* on a visual observation of the bivariate relationship. To properly

Figure 5.3. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations (Africa Only), 1993.



investigate this relationship, a multivariate analysis that can incorporate statistical controls will be required.

b. Religious Diversity and Security Rights

The bivariate relationship between religious diversity and security rights in 1993 reveals a somewhat different statistical relationship than when ethnolinguistic diversity is examined. Table 5.3 shows that the Pearson's r correlation is very weak at -.01, a figure that is nowhere close to achieving statistical significance. Thus, unlike the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights, a bivariate analysis of the relationship between religious diversity and security rights violations does not hint at any

type of linear relationship between these two phenomena. When 1983 data are used, the magnitude of the relationship is slightly larger and negative (-.11), although this relationship is still not statistically significant at the .05 level.

When one breaks down this relationship by region, one can observe a great range of correlations, from -.48 (North America) at one extreme to the Middle East (.33) at the other. This range of scores seems to indicate that some further type of analysis by region may reveal more regarding the regional disparities. Why does religious diversity appear to reduce security rights violations in North and South America, and to a lesser degree Asia, while at the same time appearing to exacerbate the problem in Africa and the Middle East? Although the direction of the relationship varies by region, it is not possible to make strong inferences from this finding. Only in the case of North America is the relationship between religious diversity and security rights found to be statistically significant. This may well be related to the small sample sizes of these regional analyses.

Table 5.3 Pearson's Correlations Between Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.

	r	N
North America	-.48 *	16
South America	-.46	12
Africa	.15	42
Middle East/N. Africa	.33	18
Asia/Pacific	-.29	17
World (1993)	-.01	105
World (1983)	-.11	104

* = significant at .05 level

In order to test the influence of each region on the overall effect, each region in turn was removed from the global analysis. When North America, South America, and

Asia were removed from the analysis, the correlation for the rest of the global sample becomes marginally positive, but still does not become statistically significant. Thus, we have little evidence that one region influences the global sample to any meaningful degree.

An analysis using Kendall's tau-b and Spearman's rho, estimates of the strength of bivariate relationships when one of the variables is ordinal, produces results that are nearly identical to the Pearson's r statistic. Both the tau-b (-.02) and Spearman's rho (-.04) statistics reveal correlations between religious diversity and security rights violations for the global sample of developing countries that are very slightly negative and not statistically significant.

Unlike ethnolinguistic diversity, then, religious diversity does not appear to be positively correlated with security rights violations based on a bivariate statistical analysis. This is an interesting finding, because it runs counter to the hypothesized direction of the relationship. This finding, in turn, leads to speculation as to why this may be the case. Is it possible that there is something about ethnic or linguistic diversity that makes governments more likely to repress their citizens, while religious diversity does not have this effect? Before discussing the differences between the two findings any further, it is necessary to perform more analyses of the bivariate relationships, and multivariate analyses as well.

This chapter now moves to a visual inspection of the bivariate relationship between religious diversity and violations of the right to personal integrity. An examination of Figure 5.4, the bivariate scatter plot of the relationship for developing countries in 1993, reveals little if anything about the nature of the relationship among the

data. The countries are rather uniformly scattered across the graph. This is the type of relationship that one might expect to see when the Pearson's correlation between the two variables is so small (-.01). No evidence of any nonlinear pattern is readily detected in the scatter plot. Neither can one easily observe any sign of any necessary or sufficient relationship between religious diversity and respect for security rights. In fact, no clear evidence of a negative or any other type of relationship exists. One possible observation from the data is that while countries with a religious fractionalization score below .40 fall about equally between higher levels of the Amnesty International score (levels 4 and 5)

Figure 5.4. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.



as they do in lower levels (levels 1 and 2), more countries with a religious fractionalization score above .40 are classified as low violators than as high violators of personal integrity rights.

Perhaps one might think that the scatter plot for the same relationship for 1983 (seen in Figure 5.5) would reveal some sort of clearer pattern, since the magnitude of the relationship was stronger in a negative direction (-.11) than were the data for 1993 (-.01). However, just as with the 1993 data, it is difficult to detect any type of pattern or conditional relationship from a visual analysis. One difference is that in 1983, both diverse countries (with diversity scores of greater than .40) and less diverse countries

Figure 5.5. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1983.



(with scores of less than .40) are more likely to have low Amnesty scores (one or two) than high ones (four or five). This is in contrast to the year 1993, where the gap only emerges in the case of more diverse countries.

In Table 5.4, a cross tabulation of the bivariate relationship between religious diversity and security rights violations for the year 1993 reveals little, if anything, about any possible relationship among the data. In fact, at least two countries appear in each of

Table 5.4 Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations, 1993.

Amnesty International Score * Religious Fractionalization Crosstabulation

			Religious Fractionalization				
			1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	Total
Amnesty International Score	1.00	Count	7	3	4	5	19
		% of Total	6.7%	2.9%	3.8%	4.8%	18.1%
	2.00	Count	9	3	5	11	28
		% of Total	8.6%	2.9%	4.8%	10.5%	26.7%
	3.00	Count	14	3	2	8	27
		% of Total	13.3%	2.9%	1.9%	7.6%	25.7%
	4.00	Count	8	4	2	5	19
		% of Total	7.6%	3.8%	1.9%	4.8%	18.1%
	5.00	Count	2	3	3	4	12
		% of Total	1.9%	2.9%	2.9%	3.8%	11.4%
Total		Count	40	16	16	33	105
		% of Total	38.1%	15.2%	15.2%	31.4%	100.0%

Values for Table: For Religious Fractionalization, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to .60, 4=.61 to 80, 5=. 81 to .99)
For Security Rights violations, 1= Lowest (Best), 5= Highest (Worst)

the 25 cells of the cross-tabulation, indicating that countries are spread out over the entire range of possibilities for this bivariate relationship. By contrast, the cross-tabulation of ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations revealed no examples of countries

in two of the cells at the corner of the cross-tabulation (the cell with the most diversity and lowest level of violations, and the cell with the least diversity and highest level of violations).

A visual examination of scatter plots of the relationship between religious diversity and security rights violations reveals no common patterns among any of the regions, with the exception of North and South America. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 reveal the

Figure 5.6 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations (North America Only), 1993.



fact that in both regions there is a lack of countries in the upper-right half of the graph (i.e., there are no countries with high levels of religious diversity and high levels of personal integrity violations). This finding is in contrast to the other regions of the world, where many diverse countries exist that experience high levels of security rights

violations. Five of the seven countries in North and South America with the worst degree (a score of 4 or 5 on the Amnesty International scale) of security rights have a religious fractionalization score of .11 or less. They are Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. Among countries with higher levels of religious diversity, only Haiti and Brazil fall into the worst categories. Although there are not enough countries in the Western Hemisphere to make a meaningful generalization, there may be cause to investigate why the worst violators in the Americas tend to be governments in countries that are homogeneous from a religious (predominantly Roman Catholic) standpoint.

Figure 5.7 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights Violations (South America Only), 1993.



In addition, an examination of the graphs of both continents reveals a similar L-shaped pattern. The meaning of this similarity between North and South America is unclear. Why did the relationship in the data occur in such a similar way in only in these two regions?

The fact that North and South America have visually similar scatter plots, as well as almost identical Pearson's r scores (-.48 for North America and -.46 for South America) appears to warrant further research in to why the two regions mirror each other so closely, yet do not resemble other regions.

5.2 Multivariate Analyses

a. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights

We now move to using multivariate analysis as a tool to assess the relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and security rights violations. Once again, the year for the analysis of the data is 1993. Contained in Table 5.6 is the output from a model that includes several control variables that have been used in previous models (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

The model will be estimated as:

$$PTS = \alpha + (Log)\hat{a}_1 PCGNP + \hat{a}_2 DEMOC3 + \hat{a}_3 THREAT + (Log)\hat{a}_4 POP + \hat{a}_5 LEFT + \hat{a}_6 BRIT + \hat{a}_7 WBELF + \varepsilon$$

Where:

PTS= Political Terror Scale Score. Ranges from '1' (lowest level of violations) to '5' (most severe violations).

PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product.

THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from '1' (nonviolent protest) to '4' (civil war).

POP= Population.

LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type.

BRIT= British colonial history.

WBELF= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score.

Refer to Table 5.5 for a description of each variable in the model and that variable's expected effect on the level of security rights. For more discussion of the variables, including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer to the description of the variables in Chapter Three.

Table 5.5 Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of Security Rights Violations (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included), 1993.

Variable	Description	Effect	Source
PCGNP	Log of Gross National Product, Lagged one Time Period	Negative	Penn World Tables
DEMOC3	Polity 3 Democracy Score	Negative	Polity III
POP	Log of Population Lagged one Time Period	Positive	Penn World Tables
LEFT	Presence of Leftist Government	Positive	Poe, Tate, Keith (1999)
THREAT	Threat to Regime, Lagged one Time Period	Positive	Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001)
BRIT	British Colonial History	Negative	Poe, Tate, Keith (1999)
WBELF	World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Score	Positive	Annett (2000)

Table 5.6 presents the results from a multivariate regression that predicts security rights violations. An analysis of the relationship between each of the regressors in the model reveals no apparent problem with multicollinearity. None of the bivariate

correlations between the model variables are greater than .40. Klein tests also revealed no hint of multicollinearity.

Table 5.6 Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Per Capita GNP/ $1000 (log)	-.16	.08	.051	-.16 *
Democracy	-.06	.02	.004	-.21 *
Threat (lagged)	.44	.06	.000	.57 *
Population (log)	.23	.06	.000	.31 *
Leftist Regime	-.62	.33	.066	-.14 *
British Colonial History	-.07	.16	.672	-.03
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-.98	.34	.005	-.21 *

* = p< .05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (7, 78) = 21.17

Adjusted R-Squared = .62
Root Mean Square Error= .709
Prob > F = 0.0000

The model as a whole is rather robust, as it explains about 62 percent of the total variation in security rights violations, as measured by the R-Squared statistic. An F-test rejects the possibility that the regression parameters could have occurred by chance alone.

Moving to the impact of the individual variables, the first regressor to be examined is wealth. As is the case with in the Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) model, per capita GNP is negatively correlated with high levels of security rights violations, as measured by the Amnesty International score. This measure is also statistically significant at the .05 level.

The level of democracy, as measured by the Polity III (which is intended to capture the level of opportunity for participation in a political system), is also negatively

related to security rights violations, and its coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level.

As predicted, the level of threat to the regime has a strong, positive effect on the level of security rights violations. This finding is consistent with the earlier findings of Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001).

Population also has the same effect as hypothesized in the Poe et al. analyses. Higher populations are associated with higher levels of personal integrity abuse, an effect that is statistically significant at the .05 level.

Regime type is another variable that is included in the model. Counter to the hypothesis above, a leftist regime leads to lower levels of security rights violations, *ceteris paribus* (holding other factors constant). This statistic is statistically significant using a one-tailed t-test with a significance level of .05.

The last control variable, history of British rule, does not appear to be associated with either a higher or lower level of personal integrity abuse. The coefficient reveals a negative relationship between British colonial history and personal integrity violations, as was the case with the work of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999). However, the coefficient (-.03) is small and does not approach statistical significance.

Finally, the model reveals the effects of our research variable, ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Controlling statistically for alternative explanations for why regimes violate the personal integrity rights of their citizens, more diverse countries are associated with *lower* (better) Amnesty International scores. In other words, higher levels of ethnolinguistic diversity, *ceteris paribus*, leads to lower levels of personal integrity abuse. The finding that higher levels of ethnic diversity correspond to lower levels of state-

sponsored security rights violations runs counter to the hypothesized direction of the effect.

Does ethnolinguistic diversity really affect respect for security rights in a meaningful way? In order to answer this question a regression with all of the explanatory variables *except* ethnolinguistic fractionalization was run. I find that the adjusted R-Squared falls from .62 to .57, meaning that one can explain a full five percentage more of the total variance when one includes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a model of security rights. The additional impact that ethnolinguistic diversity adds to the dependent variable suggests that ethnolinguistic diversity contributes in a non-trivial way to statistical attempts to explain respect for security rights.

In evaluating the overall impact of the various explanatory variables on the dependent variable, personal integrity abuse, it is apparent that level of threat faced by a country's ruling regime has the greatest effect. Its beta weight is .57, much higher than that of any other regressor. Population has the second greatest effect, with a beta of .31. Democracy, per capita GNP, and leftist regime type all have much smaller effects. The beta weight of British history is quite small, and since its effect is not statistically significant, it appears to not have a major direct impact on the propensity of governments to violate the security rights of their citizens.

An examination of the standardized coefficients reveals that ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the variable whose effects are the subject of this study, has a relative impact that is about the same as that of wealth (measured by per capita GNP), and somewhat higher than that of democracy. Its effect is just over half as large as that of population, and just over a third than that of threat to regime.

In short, a multivariate analysis reveals that ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a nontrivial and statistically significant depressing effect on security rights violations. Holding other potential explanatory factors at their statistical means, countries that are more diverse are *less* likely to violate the right to personal integrity of their citizens. From this brief analysis, an argument might be presented for the inclusion of ethnolinguistic diversity in the growing list of phenomena that are linked by researchers to the level of security rights violations by regimes. Again, it is interesting to note that ethnolinguistic fractionalization exhibits a downward effect on the level of security rights violations, which is counter to the expectation that higher levels of diversity will lead to higher levels of repression.

It may be possible to go farther in analyzing this relationship. By positing and empirically testing causal linkages between the various explanatory factors, we may obtain a clearer picture of how these various causal factors are related to one another.

A first step in model building is often to trim the model of variables that are not found to have a significant effect. In the model above, a British colonial history is not found to have a statistically significant effect on personal integrity abuse, *ceteris paribus*. And its relative impact is found to be very small in terms of its beta weight. Therefore, a good first step would be to re-estimate the model without the British history variable.

Table 5.7 reveals that eliminating the British rule variable has almost no reduction of the explanatory power of the model. The root mean square error is virtually unchanged, and the adjusted R-Squared actually improves. Thus, a good starting point for a causal model will be the combination of variables in Table 5.6. There is virtually no change in the beta coefficients of the remaining variables in the model.

Table 5.7 Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations, British History Variable Omitted, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (logged)	-.16	.08	.054	-.16 *
Democracy	-.06	.02	.004	-.20 *
Threat (lagged)	.45	.06	.000	.57 *
Population (t-1) (logged)	.23	.06	.000	.31 *
Leftist Regime	-.61	.33	.068	-.14 *
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-.98	.34	.005	-.21 *

* = p<.05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (6, 79) = 24.93

Adjusted R-Squared = .63
Root Mean Square Error= .705
Prob > F = 0.0001

In order to better specify the relationship between diversity and security rights, a path analytical model is presented in Figure 5.8. In this causal model, all of the variables in the original regression are hypothesized to have the same direct effects on the dependent variable, threat to regime, and security rights. However, the model also attempts to capture the indirect effects of two of the variables, religious fractionalization and population. The rationale for assessing the indirect effects of these two variables is as follows: We are interested in the effects of all of the model variables on the dependent variable. But three of the variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, population, and the leftist regime variable, can be considered to be exogenous. In other words, none of the model variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly.

Of these three exogenous variables, it is not plausible that the leftist regime variable has an effect on any of the variables in the model. However, it may be that the other two exogenous variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and population, may affect wealth, democratic openness, and threat to regime. In keeping with the existing

hypothesis above, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is hypothesized to reduce the level of respect for security rights. Thus, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is hypothesized as leading to a lower level of wealth and democratic openness, and a higher level of threat to the regime. In keeping with the generally negative theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the effects of population, this variable is also hypothesized to lower wealth and democratic openness, and increase the level of threat to the regime.

Figure 5.8 Causal Model of Security Rights Violations (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included)



This model is an improvement of a linear multivariate model because it allows for the inclusion of both direct and indirect effects of the model variables. This is particularly useful for understanding the effects of the independent variable that we are interested in, ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

Figure 5.8 displays a path diagram of a causal model involving the variables in the equation above. Included in the diagram are unidirectional links between variables and the hypothesized direction of the relationship.

Essentially, the way this model can be estimated is by working backwards, making security rights violations a dependent variable, and the other model variables independent. Subsequently, the other endogenous variables--per capita GNP, democracy, and threat--are made dependent variables to those variables hypothesized to be exogenous to them, population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The direction and relative strength of each of the variables can be obtained from the beta weights in each regression. Following Tan (1999), only the links that are statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed) or higher are drawn in the diagram.

Table 5.8 Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-.16	.061	.008	-.26 *
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-1.34	.452	.004	-.28 *

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

Table 5.9 Regression of Democracy, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-.14	.29	.62	-.06
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-1.46	1.80	.42	-.09

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

Table 5.10 Regression of Threat, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	.30	.07	.000	.39
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	.53	.55	.337	.09

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

Tables 5.7 through 5.10 show the regressions that are necessary to estimate the set of equations that comprise the fully estimated causal model in Figure 5.8. The direct effects, which are the beta weights in each of the regressions, are calculated in Table 5.7. In order to obtain the indirect effects, the endogenous explanatory variables, per capita GNP, democracy, and threat are regressed [in Tables 5.8 through 5.10] on the two variables that are hypothesized to affect them--population and ethnolinguistic diversity.

Figure 5.9 is a fully estimated causal model of security rights. The path diagrams of the relationships in the model allow for a better understanding of the relative effects of all of the independent variables on the dependent variable, accounting for both their direct *and* indirect impacts on security rights.

An analysis of the results from the multivariate causal model in Figure 5.9 reveals a number of interesting findings. In Table 5.11 one can see that the direct effect of higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a lower level of security rights violations (beta= -.21), all other factors held constant. However, this effect is somewhat offset by the *indirect* effect via per capita GNP (beta= .04). In other words, while the direct effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is to *lower* the level of security rights violations, it also corresponds to a lower level of wealth, which in turn is associated with *higher* levels of repression, *ceteris paribus*. Nonetheless, although the indirect effect of ethnolinguistic

diversity is to raise security rights violations, the overall net effect still leads to lower levels of repression.

Figure 5.9 Causal Model of Personal Integrity Rights Violations (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Included), 1993.



Judging from the beta weights presented in Table 5.11, the relative impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is slightly smaller than that of democratic openness, and slightly larger than that of per capita GNP and the presence of a leftist regime type. However, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a relative effect on the dependent variable that is less than a third as strong as the threat variable and of population (with net effects of .57 each).

Table 5.11 Direct and Indirect Effects of Model Variables on Security Rights Violations, 1993.

	Direct	Indirect	Total
Per Capita GNP	-.16	N/A	-.16
Democracy	-.20	N/A	-.20
Threat	.57	N/A	.57
Leftist Regime	-.14	N/A	-.14
Population	.31	.04 (via GNP) .22 (via threat)	.57
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-.21	.04 (via GNP)	-.17

If the findings for the year 1993 can be generalized to other time periods, these findings may indicate that ethnolinguistic fractionalization does not have a harmful effect on security rights. In fact, when one accounts the effects of alternative explanatory variables, its net effect on security rights actually appears to be beneficial. This being said, the effect of ethnicity does not appear to be particularly powerful in comparison to the harmful effects of large populations and high levels of regime threat.

b. Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights

This chapter now moves to an analysis of the multivariate relationship between security rights and *religious* fractionalization. Table 5.13 is a multivariate model that uses religious rather than ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an explanatory variable.

The model will be estimated as:

$$PTS = \alpha + (\log)\hat{a}_1 PCGNP + \hat{a}_2 DEMOC3 + \hat{a}_3 THREAT + (\log)\hat{a}_4 POP + \hat{a}_5 LEFT + \hat{a}_6 BRIT + \hat{a}_7 WBREL + \varepsilon$$

Where:

PTS= Political Terror Scale Score. Ranges from '1' (lowest level of violations) to '5' (most severe violations).

PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product.

THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the Regime. Ranges from '1' (nonviolent protest) to '4' (civil war).

POP= Population.

LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type.

BRIT= British colonial history.

WBREL= World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index score.

Refer back to Table 4.12 for a description of the variables. For further information about the variables in the model, please refer to Chapter 3.

The results of Table 5.12 are similar in most respects to those in Table 5.5, which included ethnolinguistic fractionalization as the independent variable rather than the current variable of interest, religious fractionalization. Almost all of the relationships

among the variables in this analysis have coefficients that are signed in the same direction and of similar magnitude as was the case with ethnolinguistic fractionalization. As in the model including ethnolinguistic fractionalization, only the coefficient for history of British rule does not approach statistical significance. The notable difference in the two models is that while ethnolinguistic fractionalization had a statistically significant negative effect (at the .05 level) on the level of security rights violations, religious fractionalization does not achieve statistical significance except at the .10 level. In other words, while both diversity variables are negatively signed, indicating an inverse relationship with personal integrity abuse, the coefficient for ethnolinguistic fractionalization achieves a higher level of statistical significance.

Table 5.12 Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Log Per Capita GNP/$1000 (t-1)	-.12	.08	.148	-.13 *
Democracy	-.06	.02	.005	-.21 *
Threat (t-1)	.43	.06	.000	.56 *
Log Population (t-1)	.19	.06	.001	.26 *
Leftist Regime	-.51	.35	.142	-.11 *
British Colonial History	.04	.18	832	.02
Religious Fractionalization	-.53	.36	.147	-.12

* = p<.05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (7, 78) = 18.84
Adjusted R-Squared = .60
Root Mean Square Error= .736
Prob > F = 0.0000

When religious diversity replaces ethnolinguistic diversity [see Table 5.5 for the earlier model] as a variable in an explanatory model of personal integrity abuse, the goodness-of-fit is slightly worse. Table 5.12 reveals that when the switch is made, the model's adjusted R-Squared drops from .62 to .60, and the root mean squared error rises from .709 to .736. Because of the somewhat poorer quality of model fit and the fact that

religious diversity is not statistically significant at the .05 level in a multivariate model of personal integrity abuse, a comparison of the two models lends support for the argument that the religious fractionalization variable does not have as much of an impact in reducing personal integrity abuse as does ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

However, it may be the case that some further evidence of the relationship between religious diversity and security rights may emerge from a multivariate causal model. Again, a common first step in creating a causal model is to eliminate variables that are not statistically significant. Since once again the British history variable does not achieve statistical significance, it can be dropped and the equation from Table 5.12 can be re-estimated. Results from this analysis appear in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13 Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations (British History Variable Omitted), 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Logged Per Capita GNP (t-1)	-.12	.08	.148	-.12
Democracy	-.06	.02	.005	-.21 *
Threat (t-1)	.43	.06	.000	.56 *
Log Population (t-1)	.19	.06	.001	.26 *
Leftist Regime	-.52	.34	.135	-.11
Religious Fractionalization	-.50	.33	.137	-.12

* = p<.05 (one-tailed)
N=86
F (6, 79) = 21.32
Adjusted R-Squared = .60
Root Mean Square Error= .731
Prob > F = 0.0000

Predictably, the output of this model does not change very much. Religious fractionalization not only is still not statistically significant at the .05 level, and the beta coefficient is the same (-.12). All of the other model coefficients are still found to be statistically significant and in the same direction as before. As for goodness-of-fit, dropping the British historical influence variable leaves the adjusted R-Squared

unchanged at .60, and the mean squared error declines from .736 to .731. Because the model is more parsimonious and its goodness-of-fit is slightly better, it is safe to say that this is a better model than the full model.

Figure 5.10 **Causal Model of Security Rights Violations (Religious Fractionalization Included).**



In order to better specify the relationship between religious diversity and security rights, a path analytical model is presented in Figure 5.10. As in the model for the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization above, all of the variables in the original regression are hypothesized to have the same (harmful) direct effects on security rights, threat to regime, and security rights. The model also attempts to capture the indirect effects of two of the variables, religious fractionalization and population. We are interested in assessing the indirect effects of religious fractionalization and population because it allow us to more fully understand the relationship among the variables in the model.

We are interested in the effects of all of the model variables on the dependent variable. But, as before, three of the variables, religious fractionalization, population, and the leftist regime variable, can be considered to be exogenous. That is, none of the model variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly.

Of these three exogenous variables, there is not a theoretical expectation that the leftist regime variable has an effect on any of the variables in the model. However, it may be that the other two exogenous variables, religious fractionalization and population, may affect wealth, democratic openness, and threat to regime. Religious fractionalization is hypothesized to have a derogatory effect on security rights, and is hypothesized to have a harmful effect on the three endogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is hypothesized to increase the level of wealth and democratic openness, and to lower the level of threat to the regime. In keeping with the generally negative theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the effects of population, religious fractionalization is also hypothesized to lower wealth and democratic openness, and increase the level of threat to the regime.

This model will better allow for the estimation of the actual effects of the variables by allowing for the estimation of both direct and indirect effects. This is particularly useful for understanding the effects of the independent variable of interest, religious fractionalization.

Tables 5.14 through 5.16 display the results of the other regressions necessary to complete estimation of the causal model of security rights that uses religious fractionalization as an explanatory variable. In Table 5.14, one can see that religious fractionalization has a negative effect on wealth, controlling for population size. Table 5.15 reveals the finding that religious diversity is negatively correlated with level of democratic openness, net of population size. The result of Table 5.16 is that population does not have a statistically significant effect on the level of threat to a regime when controlling for the effects of population size. Rather, higher populations appear to be an important factor that contributes to higher levels of threat.

Table 5.14 Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-.24	.06	.000	-.37 *
Religious Fractionalization	-1.56	.41	000	-.33 *

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

Table 5.15 Regression of Democracy, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	-.23	.28	.401	-.09
Religious Fractionalization	-.255	1.64	.123	-.17 *

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

Table 5.16 Regression of Threat, 1993.

	Coef.	Std. Err.	p>|t|	Beta
Population	.33	.07	.000	.41 *
Religious Fractionalization	-.25	.51	.63	-.04

* = p<.10 (one-tailed) N=86

An inspection of the path diagram in Figure 5.11, reveals only one notable difference from the earlier model (Figure 5.9), which included ethnolinguistic rather than religious fractionalization. The beta weight of the effect of religious fractionalization (.12) is noticeably less than the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (.21). All of the other effects in the model are of the same direction and of similar magnitude as was the case in the earlier model. Per capita GNP, level of democratic openness, and leftist regime all are associated with lower levels of repression of the right to personal integrity. Likewise, size of population and level of threat to regime are associated with increased levels of repression, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 5.17 reveals that the relative impacts of the other model variables (as measured by their beta weights) are rather similar to what they were in the model that uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization as the explanatory diversity variable (Table 5.10). Interestingly, while the total impact of religious diversity is negative (beta= -.04), its effect is of a smaller magnitude than when ethnolinguistic fractionalization (beta= -.17) is used as the measure of diversity. While the direct effect of religious fractionalization is to lower personal integrity violations (beta= -.12), it indirectly leads to higher levels of violations because it is positively associated with two harmful effects-- lower levels wealth and democratic openness. Thus, the relatively small net impact of religious fractionalization is a result of the harmful indirect effects it has on security rights via

reduced wealth and level of democracy, which in turn correspond to higher levels of repression.

Figure 5.11 Causal Model of Security Rights Violations (Religious Fractionalization Included), 1993.



Table 5.17 Direct and Indirect Effects of Model Variables on Security Rights, 1993.

	Direct	Indirect		Total
Per Capita GNP	-.12	N/A		-.12
Democracy	-.21	N/A		-.21
Threat	.56	N/A		.56
Leftist Regime	-.11	N/A		-.11
Population	.26	.04	(via GNP)	
		.23	(via threat)	.53
Religious	-.12	.04	(via GNP)	
Fractionalization		.04	(via democracy)	-.04

5.3 Summary

Does the level of ethnic and religious diversity in a given population lead, all things being equal, to more or less government respect for security rights? This chapter attempts to answer this question using both bivariate and multivariate analyses. The following broad findings emerge from an analysis of the relationship between religious diversity and security rights:

First, a simple bivariate analysis shows that, as hypothesized, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is positively associated with a higher level of security rights violations, as measured by the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale measure. The same relationship does not emerge with religious fractionalization, however, as it is not found to be correlated with personal integrity abuse. Why exactly one type of diversity is related to higher personal integrity violations and the other is not is a question that needs to be investigated in future research. Bivariate scatter plots do not suggest any type of linear or nonlinear relationship between either type of diversity and security rights. Finally, the visual scatter plots of both religious and ethnolinguistic diversity reveal no

linear or nonlinear relationships, and do not hint at any type of necessary or sufficient conditional relationship between independent and dependent variables.

Second, as is the case in the previous chapter, the bivariate relationship between diversity and security rights appears to manifest itself differently in different regions of the world. While in the global sample of countries, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is found to be associated with higher levels of personal integrity abuse, the only continent in which this finding is reproduced is in Asia. In the case of religious fractionalization, diversity is only a statistically significant factor in the case of one region—it is negatively associated with personal integrity abuse in North America. No common patterns emerge among the data when regional scatter plots are observed.

Third, in a multivariate context, ethnolinguistic fractionalization corresponds to lower levels of security rights violations. This finding runs counter to the hypothesized direction of the relationship. When accounting for population size and degree of threat faced by a regime, both of which raise the level of security rights violations, ethnolinguistic diversity has a positive effect on security rights. While a multivariate regression reveals that it has a beneficial effect, the net impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is only about one-third that of population size and domestic threat. When included in a causal model that captures both direct and indirect effects, this net effect shrinks even further, as the ethnolinguistic diversity has a small indirect positive effect on the level of security rights violations, via the fact that it lowers per capita GNP.

Fourth, in a multivariate model, religious fractionalization also has the effect of lowering the level of security rights violations, *ceteris paribus*. In order to get a picture of the direct and indirect impacts of the variables in the model, a multivariate causal

model was employed. This model reveals that while religious diversity does lead to a reduced level of security rights violations in a country, its relative impact on the dependent variable is only about one-fourth of the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, largely because its beneficial direct effect is somewhat offset by the fact that it is associated with lower levels of wealth and democracy, which indirectly leads to higher security rights violations.

To summarize, an analysis of the relationship between diversity and security rights reveals that higher levels of both religious and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are related to lower levels of personal integrity violations, *ceteris paribus*. While both types of diversity have beneficial net effects, the effect of religious fractionalization is much smaller.

Chapter Six will summarize the important findings of the paper, and discuss the theoretical and practical implications for scholars and policy makers.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The central purpose of this dissertation has been to explore the relationship between societal diversity and basic human rights. Since the existing social science literature has little to say regarding this topic, it is a very challenging endeavor to create new theoretical ideas about the nature of this relationship, and to find appropriate ways to empirically test this body of theory. Hopefully, future efforts will further assess how diversity affects rights performance. This chapter summarizes the empirical findings of my research and discusses their implications. I will also suggest possible directions for further research.

6.1 Summary of Findings

In Chapter 4, I explored the relationship between cultural diversity and subsistence rights. Most prior research has focused on the interaction between diversity and economic performance, and generally found that the more diverse the society, the lower the society's economic performance. I hypothesized that governments are be less likely to ensure that the right to subsistence in ethnically and linguistically diverse countries. The analyses appear to confirm this hypothesis.

A bivariate analysis of a sample of developing nations in reveals that in both the 1980s and 1990s ethnolinguistic diversity were statistically correlated with lower levels of Physical Quality of Life. This relationship is statistically significant. The relationship occurs in the same direction when religious diversity is used as the explanatory variable,

although the relationship is not as strong as for ethnolinguistic diversity. While one cannot discount the possibility that the effect of religion on the dependent variable is weaker, a possible explanation for the difference is that the range of values for the religion variable is somewhat smaller. This difference may partly explain why the relationship between religious diversity and subsistence rights is weaker.

I also performed multivariate analyses that included a number of control variables. Ethnolinguistic diversity was again found to have a statistically significant downward effect on subsistence rights. In addition, the absolute value of its effect was rather strong, as only democracy was found to have a higher relative impact on the dependent variable. Religious diversity also had a statistically significant downward effect on the level of subsistence rights, but its relative effect was not as strong as for ethnolinguistic diversity. Three other variables in this model had relative effects that were higher. Thus, in a multivariate context it appears that ethnolinguistic diversity has a greater effect on human rights performance than does religious diversity.

Finally, I tested the relationship between diversity and subsistence rights using path analysis. This type of statistical analysis uses the same variables used in the regressions above, but orders them in a logical causal fashion that allows for testing not only of direct effects, but indirect effects through intervening variables as well. Using this type of analysis, ethnolinguistic diversity again exhibits a statistically significant downward effect on the level of subsistence rights. In fact, when accounting for both direct and indirect effects, ethnolinguistic diversity actually has an impact on the dependent variable that has the highest absolute impact of any variable in the model. In addition to its direct effect, ethnolinguistic diversity has a harmful indirect effect on

subsistence performance because it contributes to lower levels of economic development, which in turn has a downward effect on subsistence rights levels. In short, the effect of ethnic and linguistic cleavages is found to be clearly deleterious toward the level of subsistence rights in a given society, *ceteris paribus* (holding all other factors constant).

When employing a causal model, religious diversity was also found to have a statistically significant adverse effect on the level of subsistence enjoyed by citizens. While the direct effect of religious diversity is only about half of that of ethnolinguistic diversity, when one includes the indirect effects in the model, religious diversity has nearly as harmful an effect on subsistence rights as its fellow diversity measure. The two variables that intervene between religious diversity and lower subsistence rights are level of economic development and level of threat. Higher levels of religious diversity lead to lower levels of the former and higher levels of the latter, which both correspond to lower performance on the subsistence rights measure.

The results from Chapter 4 not only point toward high levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity leading to lower levels of subsistence rights, but they also suggest that the situation is exacerbated by the presence of lower levels of economic development in diverse societies. The finding that both types of societal diversity are harmful to subsistence rights is consistent with the hypotheses laid out in Chapter Three.

Chapter 5 explores the relationship between diversity and security rights. Most research related to this area of inquiry focuses on the nexus between diversity and ethnic conflict or violence. Many, though not all, of these studies find that higher levels of diversity lead to higher levels of violence. I theorized that high levels of both

ethnolinguistic and religious diversity lead to a higher level of security rights violations. The findings of this analysis are more complex than those for subsistence rights.

An inspection of the bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights showed that higher levels of ethnic and religious heterogeneity were associated with higher levels of violations of personal integrity rights. However, religious diversity did not have a statistically significant effect on security rights.

Moving to a multivariate analysis of security rights, both types of diversity were statistically found to lower the level of security rights violations. This ran counter to the hypotheses, which posited a harmful effect for higher levels of diversity. However, the relative effects of the diversity variable were small when compared to the effects of other model variables. In particular, the level of threat to the regime posed by a society has a much larger effect than diversity.

The path analytical models also find that both types of diversity lowered the level of personal integrity violations. The effect of ethnolinguistic diversity is less than a third that of population size and the level of threat to the regime posed by society. Comparatively speaking, the effect of religious diversity, while still nominally beneficial and statistically significant, is very small. While its direct effect is somewhat small in comparison with other model variables, this effect is diminished even further due to the harmful indirect effects it has on security rights through lowering the levels of wealth and democracy. The total effect of religious diversity, then, is much smaller than any of the other variables in the path analytical model, and is less than one-twelfth that of two of the other variables, population and threat to regime.

Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, although they have somewhat comparable effects, ethnolinguistic and religious diversity clearly do not measure exactly the same concept. Particularly when it comes to security rights, religious diversity clearly does not have as beneficial a net effect as does ethnolinguistic diversity. I suspect that part of the difference in the effects of the variables may be due to measurement issues, since ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a greater range of variation than its religious counterpart.

Second, societal heterogeneity is found to be related not only to poor economic performance, but to poor levels of subsistence as well. This finding should not be surprising, since it makes intuitive sense that governments in poorer countries are less able to meet the basic needs of their citizens. The theoretical implications for the economic development literature are that the limitations upon economic efficiency that are hypothesized to come from cultural diversity (i.e., due to less flexible institutions, higher transaction costs, etc.) extend not only to wealth but to basic human needs as well. This research also adds weight to the arguments of scholars such as Douglass North that high societal pluralism forces leaders to devote too many resources to goods beneficial only to single groups rather than to public goods that can benefit all. As a potential explanation for poor levels of subsistence rights, this idea appears to hold great promise, particularly since theories of state behavior with regard to subsistence rights protection are scarce.

Since this research has found a greater role for ethnic and linguistic diversity than for religious diversity in explaining poor subsistence rights in the developing world, it

appears that future research should focus on the role of culture and language as keys to subsistence rights and economic well-being.

From a practical standpoint, this finding sounds a pessimistic note about the ability of diverse nations to provide for the basic necessities of their own people. While other factors may play a larger role, at the least it appears safe to say that these findings present a credible challenge to the position that diversity might improve subsistence rights performance.

Third, the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and provision of security rights appears to be an extremely complicated one. While simple bivariate analyses detected little beneficial effect of ethnic diversity on violations to personal integrity, multivariate analyses suggest that diversity contributes to better personal integrity performance. Clearly, as previous research suggests, there are a large number of factors, including regime type, economic development, political conditions, demographic factors, and many others, that combine to determine the level of respect a government has for personal integrity rights. Unfortunately, this research does not shed much light on the complex relationship between diversity and security rights within this bigger picture. At the minimum, this research suggests caution to avoid the trap of assuming that because diverse countries tend to violate the personal integrity rights of their citizens, there is a direct relationship between higher levels of societal pluralism and higher levels of security rights violations. While it is indeed quite possible that diversity presents many challenges to the prospects for societal order and good governance, it would be folly to argue that merely because a society is diverse, leaders are more likely to use repression as a governance strategy. Thus, this research places in question the widely held view that

regimes in more diverse societies are somehow more repressive than in less heterogeneous settings.

Notably, then, this research effort does not support the arguments of those who believe that diversity is problematic for good governance, such as Mill and Dahl. It rejects the research hypothesis that diversity is harmful to security rights. Perhaps it is the case (in line with the position of Etzioni) that the existence of a diverse set of mobilized groups in society serves as a restraint on state behavior. This finding clearly deserves more attention from future research.

Perhaps this counterintuitive finding means that regimes in diverse regimes are more constrained from employing repressive measures than are their counterparts in more homogeneous societies. It may be the case that a multiplicity of groups allows for greater level of civil society, which can serve as a bulwark against repressive state behavior. This possibility is in agreement with the views of Etzioni (2001), who believes that social capital develops ("thickens") when different groups develop informal norms of tolerance, trust, and mutual restraint. The presence of diversity does have the potential to divide people of different nationalities. However in situations where a common national identity emerges, such as in the United States, Etzioni argues that the presence of a multiplicity of nationalities within a common state (a "community of communities") is benign. Americans are "contained by a shared American creed and a set of related institutions." Within this common framework, they are able to express their cultural uniqueness. To Etzioni, the fact that a multiplicity of groups has a role in defining values is preferable to a situation in which all values are defined by the state because individuals

have a greater deal of freedom to express their individual cultural identities without directly clashing with the state (Etzioni 2001).

Finally, I must point out that it would be a mistake, based on this research, to assume that the manipulation of borders or populations to alter societal diversity levels will improve social outcomes. As Paul Collier (1998) points out, “There is nothing which a country can legitimately do about its ethnic composition, and illegitimate acts, notably ethnic cleansing, should hardly be encouraged" (1). In other words, if social scientists confirm the fact that diversity leads to lower subsistence rights, this does not mean that borders should be redrawn to create a more homogeneous world. This type of solution might well be worse than the cure. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which included a number of ethnic cleansings, is an example of the devastating results of attempting to redraw a country along ethnic lines.

However, in practical terms, powerful countries such as the United States do periodically have the opportunity to create new regimes from old ones. An excellent example is the former Yugoslavia, where the United States has approved measures to create multiethnic countries (i.e., Bosnia), as well as tacitly approved measures designed to make countries more homogeneous (as is the case when they assisted the Croatian Army to remove Serbs from Eastern Croatia). In any case, the current bias of the United States toward tinkering with ethnicity (i.e., Afghanistan, Yugoslavia) can not be corroborated by this research effort. There is nothing in my findings that strongly suggests that a regime in a diverse nation is more or less likely to violate the security rights of its citizens than is a regime in a homogeneous one.

6.2 Suggestions for Further Research

Political scientists have only begun to explore how ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other types of societal heterogeneity affect political and economic factors. As a result, I hope that future research focuses on finding out the true nature of the effects of diversity. Part of this means improving the available data on societal diversity. It will be a challenging task will to create new testable theories regarding the effects of diversity, so that this phenomenon can be integrated into the existing body of knowledge regarding the determinants of political and economic performance.

One concrete suggestion is to research the relationships between diversity and political stability, societal trust, and the level of threat posed to regimes by disaffected groups in society. Perhaps some sort of public opinion study or some other individual-level type of research will shed light on the role of cultural diversity and group identity in building societal trust and increasing the propensity to join organized opposition groups.

A second suggestion is that researchers attempt to clearly understand and measure the concept of societal heterogeneity. Much of the existing literature measures the concept of diversity with a single formula, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. This measure is certainly better than no measure at all, but its conceptual value is limited. It yields only a single numerical value for diversity in a society, failing to specify the number of groups in the society or the relative sizes of each group. So, for example, it does not distinguish between a country with only a few groups of relatively equal size and a country with several smaller groups. Since such societies might well be very different or behave differently, one would not expect a measure that does not capture differences between the two types of diversity to be ideal for measuring societal

heterogeneity. Hopefully, the solution will be come in the form of a multidimensional measure of diversity that can capture the effects of both the relative distribution of groups in society *and* the number of groups in society. In addition, researchers need to clarify more clearly exactly what they mean by "ethnic" and "religious" diversity before they begin to gather data for these measures, so that they know exactly what type of data they need to collect.

Third, researchers need to create and test theories that specify different effects for different types of diversity. In my dissertation I do not distinguish theoretically between religious and ethnolinguistic diversity, yet I find differences in the effects of these two factors. At this time, there is no literature that I am aware of that discusses the differences between these types of diversity. Yet it may make sense to expect different effects from different concepts.

The final suggestion is one aimed at human rights researchers. In preparing this dissertation, I have noticed that in the community of economists who study economic development and political stability in the developing world, researchers are able to successfully integrate the findings of their colleagues regarding the effects of diversity into their own research efforts. By contrast, the political science community, in the study of diversity as in many other areas of research, often blissfully ignores the work of other disciplines. I urge all researchers studying of the political effects of diversity to work together rather than separately, as the possibility for cumulation and integration of knowledge depends on cooperation.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
wbrel	105	.3669524	.2648662	0	.79
wbelf	106	.5435849	.2577935	.06	.95
pqlilag	106	64.85764	17.6019	23.67	91.39
lpoplag	106	15.62528	1.916605	11.14	20.87
threatl1	106	1.773585	1.501003	0	4
left	106	.0660377	.2495279	0	1
brit	106	.4245283	.4966193	0	1
sdnew	106	2.830189	1.334321	1	5
ainew	106	2.764151	1.26906	1	5
democ3	87	4.126437	4.068611	0	10
newpqli	106	65.1734	17.54388	24.23	91.5
pcgnplgl	103	6.857425	1.232579	4.094	9.9997

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wbrel= World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index Score

wbelf= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index Score

pqlilag= Physical Quality of Life Index Score (1992)

lpoplag= Log of population (1992)

threatl1= Threat to regime from organized opposition (1992)

left= Leftist regime type dummy variable (1993)

brit= British colonial influence dummy variable

sdnew= State Department Political Terror Scale score (1993)

ainew= Amnesty International Political Terror Scale score (1993)

democ3= Polity 3 democracy score (1993)

newpqli= Physical Quality of Life Index score (1993)

pcgnplgl= Log of Per capita GNP (1992)

APPENDIX B

LIST OF COUNTRIES AND DIVERSITY SCORES

Country	Ethnoling. Frac.	Religious Frac.	Country	Ethnoling. Frac.	Religious Frac.
Algeria	0.30	0.02	Ghana	0.73	0.79
Angola	0.80	0.48	Grenada	0.54	0.47
Argentina	0.41	0.16	Guatemala	0.52	0.11
Bahamas	0.44	0.45	Guinea	0.77	0.44
Bahrain	0.38	0.1	Guyana	0.63	0.72
Bangladesh	0.07	0.25	Haiti	0.10	0.3
Barbados	0.20	0.3	Honduras	0.25	0.08
Belize	0.58	0.48	India	0.90	0.36
Benin	0.87	0.56	Indonesia	0.79	0.68
Bolivia	0.71	0.14	Iran	0.76	0.04
Botswana	0.48	0.65	Iraq	0.39	0.08
Brazil	0.64	0.22	Israel	0.29	0.21
Burkino Faso	0.76	0.61	Ivory Coast	0.87	0.71
Burundi	0.29	0.36	Jamaica	0.35	0.47
Cameroon	0.82	0.75	Jordan	0.52	0.13
Cape Verde	0.48	0.08	Kenya	0.90	0.79
Cent. African Rep.	0.79	0.62	Kuwait	0.73	0.09
Chad	0.78	0.7	Laos	0.61	0.55
Chile	0.43	0.32	Lesotho	0.19	0.63
China	0.60	0.59	Liberia	0.89	0.71
Colombia	0.67	0.07	Madagascar	0.87	0.66
Comoros	0.06	0.01	Malawi	0.84	0.75
Congo	0.72	0.62	Malaysia	0.70	0.68
Costa Rica	0.24	0.18	Mali	0.86	0.33
Djibouti	0.73	0.17	Mauritania	0.63	0.01
Dominica	0.20	0.18	Mauritius	0.48	0.66
Dominican Rep.	0.46	0.07	Mexico	0.59	0.1
Ecuador	0.66	0.07	Morocco	0.47	0.01
Egypt	0.25	0.31	Mozambique	0.84	0.65
El Salvador	0.15	0.07	Myanmar	0.47	0.24
Ethiopia	0.76	0.61	Nepal	0.68	0.19
Fiji	0.56	0.65	Nicaragua	0.50	0.1
Gabon	0.83	0.52	Niger	0.72	0.21
Gambia	0.73	0.27	Nigeria	0.89	0.7

Country	Ethnoling. Frac.	Religious Frac.
Oman	0.24	0.02
Pakistan	0.61	0.06
Panama	0.60	0.27
Papua N.G.	0.35	0.48
Paraguay	0.17	0.08
Peru	0.66	0.09
Philippines	0.84	0.29
Qatar	0.64	0.14
Rwanda	0.22	0.62
Saudi Arabia	0.06	0.02
Senegal	0.81	0.17
Seychelles	0.08	0.2
Siera Leone	0.79	0.58
Singapore	0.42	0.66
Solomon Is.	0.14	N/A
Somalia	0.39	0
South Africa	0.88	0.7
Sri Lanka	0.71	0.52
Sudan	0.71	0.44
Suriname	0.73	0.71
Swaziland	0.18	0.72
Syria	0.21	0.19
Tanzania	0.95	0.74
Thailand	0.63	0.15
Togo	0.73	0.67
Trinidad & Tobago	0.66	0.71
Tunisia	0.09	0.01
Turkey	0.19	0.02
UAE	0.34	0.1
Uganda	0.93	0.65
Uruguay	0.26	0.54
Vanuatu	0.16	0.48
Venezuala	0.54	0.1
W. Samoa	0.20	0.37
Yemen	0.14	0.01
Zaire	0.80	0.65
Zambia	0.91	0.72
Zimbabwe	0.53	0.72

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